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To reduce  poverty  in India
through  a strategy of rural
growth,  by increasing  the
share of farmland  operated  in
smail units,  requires  making
Access  to Land  land  distribution  more
in Rural  India  equitable.  Among  policy
measures recommended:
Selectively deregulating  land-
Robin Mearns  lease {rental) markets
reducing  transaction  costs In
land  markets, critically
reassessing land
administration  and findinc
ways  to make it more
transparent  and to  improve
land administration  incentive
structures,  promoting
women's  independent  land
rights through  policy
measures to  increase
women's  bargaining  power,
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awareness,  monitoring,  ana
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i1  INTRODUCTION
Access  to land is of fundamental  importance  in rural  India. The incidence  of poverty  is
highly  correlated  with lack of access  to land,  although  the direction  of causality  in this
relationship  is not clear. Households  that depend  on agricultural  wage labor  account  for less than
a third of all rural households  but make up almost half of those living  below the poverty line
(Agarwal 1  994a). Many of these  households  also own some land,  but in holdings  that are so
small or unproductive  that their owners  derive  a greater  share of their livelihoods  from their own
labor  than from their own land.  Land  plays a dual  role in rural  India: aside from its value as a
productive  factor,  land ownership  confers  collateral  in credit markets,  security  in the event of
natural hazards  or life contingencies,  and social status.  Those who control land  tend to exert a
disproportionate  influence  over other rural institutions,  including  labor  and credit markets.
The purpose  of this paper  is to provide  an overall  framework  for the critical assessment
of alternative  approaches  to improving  access  to land  by the rural poor in India, as part of a
broader  strategy  for reducing  poverty  through  rural growth.  Viewing  persistent  constraints  on
access  to land in their historical  context,  the paper  considers  India's record in implementing  land
reforms,  and identifies  the elements  of a new,  complementary  approach  to improving  access  to
land by the rural poor. This approach  includes  incremental  reforms in public land administration
that seek to reduce  transaction  costs in land markets,  thereby  facilitating  land transfers,  while at
the same  time increasing  transparency  and public access  to information  to ensure  that socially
excluded  groups  also benefit.
The weight of international  evidence  now strongly  endorses  a rural growth strategy  based
on the dynamism  of economically  viable, family farms.  This means increasing  the share of
farmland  operated in small units, which are demonstrably  more  equitable,  labor-intensive  and
poverty-reducing  than large holdings,  and are at least as efficient  or productive  per unit area. In
the Indian  context, in which growing  numbers  of rural inhabitants  are net consumers  rather than
producers  of food, the equity  gains will come as much  from the higher demand  for labor  than
from direct land  transfers  to the poorest  (Lipton 1985).
While India's agrarian  systems  have  not prevented  the poor from taking advantage  of
new opportunities  presented  by the Green  Revolution,  the gains from technological  innovation
remain  unequally  distributed  between  those with access  to land,  water and inputs, and those
without.  There is broad consensus  that the main causes  of rural poverty  lie in low rates of
agricultural  growth  and factor productivity  (Fan, Hazell  and Thorat 1998),  and that the key to
raising  productivity  in agriculture  lies largely in the deregulation  of the policy  environment
together  with measures  to broaden  access  to land  and complementary  inputs.  More equitable
distribution  of operational  land  holdings  would  create  more equitable  patterns of demand,  which
in turn would enhance  growth in the rural non-farm  sector  and remove some of the biases in
credit, marketing  and research  institutions  that arise from the unequal  distribution  of assets and
power (Singh 1990).  This is supported  by recent evidence  which suggests  that countries  with
more equal land distribution  experience  higher rates of economic  growth (Deininger  and Squire
1996).
This approach  is consistent  with the World  Bank's overall strategy  for rural development,
its Country  Assistance  Strategy  (CAS) for India,  and the Government  of India's own policies
under the Ninth Plan. The Bank's rural development  strategy,  resting  on the demonstrated
1efficiency of family farms, includes a renewed emphasis on access to land and the promotion of
secure land rights, particularly for the rural poor and socially excluded (World Bank 1997).
Restrictions on land rentals, for example, are discouraged as they hurt the poor by restricting the
supply of land to rent. Where land distribution is highly unequal, land reform is called for, and
lessons from experience suggest that negotiated, decentralized and participatory approaches to
land reform hold considerable promise. Institutional reforms lie at the heart of such approaches,
and require the careful building of consensus among all stakeholders involved in land
administration.
The India CAS identifies regulations around land, labor and capital markets as factors
inhibiting private investment. For example, high transaction costs in land markets act as a
significant brake on access to land through the market, and the resolution of land disputes is
bogged down by an overburdened judicial  system. World Bank support to India's  poverty
alleviation efforts emphasizes the social and economic inclusion of poor and disadvantaged
groups, complemented by a growing emphasis on rainfed agriculture within the rural
development program. Improving access to land by women is among the priority areas envisaged
for Bank support to redress gender inequities, particularly in North India. During public
consultations held to support CAS preparation in September 1997, attention was widely drawn to
the importance of land rights of the poor, women, and tribals, in the context of poverty reduction
strategies.
Land reforms are a major policy focus of the Government of India's Department of Rural
Development under the Ninth Plan (1997-2002), following recent reassessment of India's  post-
Independence land reform experience. State-initiated land reforms are conventionally believed to
have been unsuccessful in getting land to the poor in India (albeit with notable exceptions such as
West Bengal), although it is widely acknowledged that they have been successful in creating the
conditions for agricultural growth by consolidating the position of small and medium farmers.
However, recent evidence suggests that much more redistribution has been achieved than is often
supposed'. The credible threat of enforcement of ceilings legislation, for example, accounts for
much of the redistribution that has taken place through the market, even in 'non-reform'  states
such as Bihar (Yugandhar and Iyer 1993). Nonetheless, it is now recognized that the prospects
for bringing about a meaningful improvement in access to land by the rural poor may be even
stronger if attention is also turned to more pragmatic and market-oriented measures, such as the
selective liberalization of land-lease markets; the promotion of women's  land rights; and efforts
to increase transparency in land administration and public access to land records (GOI 1997a).
Incremental reforms in land administration, designed to facilitate more rapid, fairer and cheaper
conveyancing procedures, are also likely to assist in the implementation of land reform
legislation, thereby enabling state-initiated and market-oriented approaches to land reform to
complement one another.
In short, policy instruments and mechanisms that improve access to land for the rural
poor and socially excluded are of high priority in bringing about efficient, equitable, sustainable,
1 See for example  the excellent  series  produced  by the Land Reforms  Unit  of the Lal Bahadur  Shastri
National  Academy  of Administration,  Mussoorie,  based on extensive  field studies  carried  out by
Indian  Administrative  Service  probationers.  Four volumes  have  been published  to date: Yugandhar
and Iyer  (1993),  Yugandhar  and Datta  (1995),  Yugandhar  (1996),  and Aziz  and Krishna  (1997),
dealing  with  experience  in Bihar, Rajasthan,  Andhra  Pradesh,  and  Karnataka  respectively.
2and poverty-reducing  patterns  of economic  growth  in rural India.  This overview  paper  provides
the overall framework  for a more detailed  study  of the factors  that constrain  access  to land in
selected  states, and considers  potential  policy instruments  and mechanisms  to reduce  those
constraints.  Four main sections  follow  this introduction.  Section  2 presents  the analytical
framework,  followed  in section  3 by a description  of the context  within which land relations  in
India are played  out. Policy  approaches  to improving  access  to land  are likely vary from state to
state according  to differences  in agrarian  structure,  conditioned  in turn by history and political
economy.  In light of shortcomings  in available  data,  preliminary  evidence  is presented  on the
distribution  of rural land, and on the relationship  between  farm size and productivity.
Section  4 outlines  five key issues  that are suggested  to be among  the most important
constraints  on access  to land  for the rural poor  and socially  excluded,  and which warrant further
analysis  in selected  states.  These  issues  are: restrictions  on land-lease  markets,  fragmentation  of
holdings,  the widespread  failure to translate  women's legal rights into  practice,  access  to and
encroachment  on commons,  and transaction  costs  associated  with land  transfers.
The final section  summarizes  the main policy  options considered  here for enhancing
access  to land  by the rural  poor and other socially  excluded  groups.  Since land  is a state subject
in India, it is not possible  to suggest  specific  policy  options  except with reference  to particular
states.  A companion  paper  presents an exploratory,  state-level  analysis  of social exclusion  and
land administration  in the state of Orissa  (Mearns  and Sinha 1998).  This pilot study aimed to
apply  the overall framework  developed  in the present  paper  in a specific  context,  and to field-test
the methodology  so that it may be used as a 'template' for further  studies in selected  states  of
India. In order to produce  trustworthy  and meaningful  findings  relating  to the issues identified
here as priorities,  careful triangulation  is required  between  existing  survey data, village  studies,
and primary fieldwork  adopting  methods  of institutional  and stakeholder  analysis.  The intention
is that on the basis of several  state-level  studies,  each  applying  a common  framework  to a
common  set of research questions,  a broad strategy  may  be identified  for improving  access  to
land  for the rural poor in India.
32  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
The principal  concern  in this paper  is with the ability  of the rural poor and other socially
excluded  groups 2 to gain access  to and effective  control  over cultivable  land.  This calls for an
analytical  framework  that allows  for subtle  nuances  in the definition  of property  rights.
The analytical  framework  adopted  here distinguishes  individuals'  rights, claims or
interests  in land according  to three parameters:  (i) whether  or not they may legally  be upheld,
under prevailing legislation (strict legality); (ii) whether or not they are socially perceived to be
legitimate, irrespective of their strict legality (social legitimacy); and (iii) whether or not they are
actually  exercised  in practice,  and therefore  translate  into  effective  control over land  (effective
control).
The last of these parameters  refers to the degree  of tenure security  that is enjoyed  in
practice,  regardless  of the type of rights. For example,  an individual  with limited usufruct  rights
may enjoy  security  of tenure, if s/he is confident  that s/he will actually  be able to exercise  those
rights when necessary.  Conversely,  an individual  with ownership  rights to a parcel of land may
find his or her claim  to be vulnerable  to land-grabbing  by another  individual  with greater
bargaining  power, voice,  and leverage  over government  officials,  particularly  if the original
landholder's rights are not recorded  in the official  land  records.  The relative  bargaining  power of
diverse  agents  strongly influences  the extent  to which individuals  are able to enjoy  effective
command  over land and other  resources.  The rural poor and other socially  excluded  groups,  by
definition,  have less bargaining  power  vis A  vis other agents  (Leach,  Mearns  and Scoones  1998).
Generally  speaking,  ownership  rights (which  may be acquired  through inheritance  or the
sale/purchase  market)  are the most secure.  They  are also the least likely to be enjoyed  by the rural
poor and other socially  excluded  groups.  Individuals  not owning  land but still relying on land for
at least part of their livelihood  may also gain  access  to land  through:  (i) the land-lease  (rental)
market;  (ii) customary  use rights in commons;  and/or  (iii) encroachment  on public land 3. These
forms of property  rights may be more or less secure,  depending  on prevailing  legislation  (e.g. are
tenancies  legally  recognized  and protected?);  their perceived  social legitimacy  (e.g. are women
able in practice  to exercise  their legal rights  to land under  prevailing  social norms and customs?);
2 Patterns  of social  exclusion  tend  to be closely  correlated  though  not synonymous  with  the  incidence  of
poverty.  It is well  recognized  that  people  of scheduled  tribes  and  scheduled  castes  in India  are  much
more  likely  than  other  groups  to live  below  the  poverty  line.  Throughout  this  paper,  'socially
excluded  groups'  refer  to people  of scheduled  tribes  and  castes,  women,  and  the  rural  poor.  All of
these  groups  are  more  likely  than  better-off  or more  powerful  and  influential  groups  to suffer  from
forms  of discrimination  at  the  hands  of those  government  officials  with  whom  they  come  into  contact,
and  to be more  or less  excluded  from  receiving  entitlements  through  administrative  procedures.
3 Owing  to non-compatible  definitions  and  mis-classification,  it is difficult  to obtain  reliable  estimates  of
the  relative  shares  of the  total  land  area  in India  under  different  uses  and  tenure  regimes.  The  broad
picture  is as follows:  private,  cultivable  land  amounts  to around  58  percent  of  the  total  land  area  for
which  records  are  available  (of  which  around  9 percent  is fallow  and 2 percent  under  tree crops);
forest  land  amounts  to 22 percent  of the  total  area  (half  of  which  has a forest  cover  of less  than  40
percent);  uncultivated  (revenue)  'wastelands'  7 percent;  rocky,  barren  land  7 percent;  and  urban/non-
agricultural  land  7 percent.  'Commons'  include  both  cultivable  and  uncultivable  wastelands,  and
some  forest  land,  amounting  to roughly  20 per  cent  of  the  total  land  area  (World  Bank  1993:  5).
4and the relative bargaining power of the individual right-holders (e.g. in practice, are the landless
able to press their legal claim to a plot of public land?). The matrix below presents a typology of
common forms of property rights in land in India according to these three parameters (Table 1).
From a policy perspective, efforts to improve access to land for the rural poor and other
socially excluded groups may address deficiencies in any or all of these three parameters. They
may concentrate on granting new, legal rights to the asset-poor while simultaneously curtailing
the existing rights of the asset-rich, as under state-initiated, redistributive land reforms. They may
be geared towards public awareness-raising, motivated by a concern to promote social justice, as
in the case of the efforts of NGOs to protect and promote tribal and women's  land rights. In
addition, this paper also considers incremental reforms in the operation of land markets and the
practice of land administration itself, since these also have implications for the ability of the
socially excluded to gain access to land. However, none of these approaches is sufficient in
isolation. Efforts to enhance security of tenure are ultimately limited by the scope of the rights in
question; while new, legal rights may not be exercised in practice if individuals face excessive
transaction costs in land markets and in their dealings with government land administration
services.
5Socially perceived to be legitimate?
Yes  No
*  Ownership  rights,  acquired through  *  Women's  right to own land
inheritance or sale/ purchase market  independently (usually does not
(although tenure security for those  translate into effective control over
with little power/ voice may be  land, given high opportunity cost to an
vulnerable, particularly where rights  individual woman in pressing her legal
unrecorded in land records)  claim)
Yes
*  Customary  use rights  over  village  *  Legally  protected  tenancies?  (may
commons (may not effectively be  not locally be perceived as legitimate if
exercised in practice if land heavily  markets for credit and labor highly
degraded or encroached upon)  interlinked with those for land to rent)
*  Legally  protected  tenancies  under
liberalized  land-lease  market  (social
legitimacy may be ambiguous)
*  Concealed  tenancies  under oral  *  Encroachment  on commons  (whether
contracts in which rent exceeds legal  or not this translates into effective
maximum, and where length of actual  control over land depends on relative
occupancy entitles tenant to acquire  bargaining power/ voice: e.g. more
legal occupancy rights (most likely to  powerful groups may gain effective
No  prevail where factor markets highly  control over land through 'illegal'
interlinked)  acquisition of occupancy rights, while
already landless may lose effective
e  'Illegalised',  customary  use rights  control in spite of legal entitlement)
(e.g. cultivation rights of tribal
communities on forest land, forbidden  *  Alienation of tribal land (loss of
under 1980 Forest Conservation Act)  effective control over land owing to
indebtedness/ land mortgage)
Table 1  Typology of property rights in land
63  CONTEXT
Agrarian  systems  in modem India  are marked  by tremendous  diversity.  Although  the
particular  configuration  of institutions  that helps to make progressive  policy  reforms possible in
one state  may not be present in others, it is important  to be aware  of broad  variations in the
factors  that influence  patterns  of agrarian  change  (Binswanger  and Deininger  1997;  Binswanger,
Deininger  and Feder 1995).  Various  types of institution  are if relevance  in understanding  how
contemporary  agrarian systems  have evolved  in India,  including  personal  laws and customs
regarding  inheritance,  the significance  of patron-client  relations,  collective  action to overcome
ecological  risk and missing markets,  and other institutions  in village society  (Sahu 1997).  For
present  purposes,  we restrict attention  to two factors  that help to understand  the political economy
of agrarian relations  in contemporary  India:  the historical  legacy  of British  land settlements;  and
variation  between  states in enacting  and implementing  land  reform legislation.
EVOLUTION  OF LAND  TENURE  SYSTEMS
Three  broad types of land revenue  system  were introduced  to India under British  rule
(Baden-Powell  1892,  Sharma  1992a).  The  differences  between  these systems  account for
significant  variations  in the subsequent  evolution  of land  tenure systems  throughout  rural India.
This is not to suggest  that these systems  swept  away pre-existing  land relations,  however.  A
defining  characteristic  of each system  was the attempt  to incorporate  elements  of the preceding
agrarian structure,  and the interaction  of colonial  policy and existing systems  produced  widely
different local results and hybrid forms 4. Different  areas  came under British land settlements  at
different  times. Tribal areas,  in particular,  were not covered  by any of these systems,  and some
tribal areas remain to be 'settled' even  today.
Under  the zamindari or 'permanent  settlement'  system, introduced  around 1793,  feudal
lords (zamindars,  jagirdars etc) were declared  proprietors  of the land on condition  of fixed
revenue  payments  to the British  regime.  Peasants  were transformed  into tenant farmers,  and rents
were collected  by serried  ranks of intermediaries  below the level of zamindars.  This system
prevailed  over most of North India,  including  present-day  Uttar  Pradesh  (except Avadh and
Agra),  Bihar, West  Bengal,  most of Orissa,  and Rajasthan  (except Jaipur and Jodhpur),  and
covered  around 57 per cent of the total area cultivated.
The other  major system  was the ryotwari system,  introduced  in Madras  in 1792  and in
Bombay  in 1817-18.  In this case,  individual  cultivators  (ryots or raiyats)  were recognized  as
proprietors  of their land with rights  to sub-let,  mortgage,  and transfer  their land  by gift or sale.
Their tenure of land was secure  so long as revenue  payments  were made directly  to the collectors
of the colonial  administration.  The ryotwari system  held sway  over most of South  India,
including  present-day  Maharashtra,  Karnataka,  Tamil  Nadu, Kerala,  Andhra  Pradesh, and most
of Madhya Pradesh  and Assam.  The princely  states  of Jaipur  and Jodhpur  in Rajasthan  also fell
under ryotwari-type  systems.  Pockets  of zamindari-type  tenure  existed  within  these ryotwari
areas,  particularly  where administered  by local rajas or nawabs.  Ryotwari systems  accounted  for
around  38 per cent of the total cultivated  area.
4 For  example,  the  techniques  and  instruments  used  in land  surveying  in many  parts  of India  even  today
remain  substantially  unchanged  since  their  introduction  by Todormal,  Emperor  Akbar's  finance
minister  during  the 16"t  century.
7The third type of system was the mahalwari system, in which revenue settlement was
made with entire villages as collective units. Peasant farmers contributed shares of the total
revenue demand for the village (maha!) in proportion to their respective holdings. The state was
initially entitled to as much as 83 per cent of gross produce in revenue, although this was later
lowered to 66 per cent. The mahalwari system was introduced between 1820 and 1840 to Punjab
(including both present-day Pun  jabs in Pakistan and India, and the state of Haryana), parts of
what are now Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, and the princely states of Avadh and Agra in Uttar
Pradesh. This type of tenure system was much less extensive, and accounted for some 5 per cent
of the cultivated area.
Although land markets had existed since at least the Moghul period, transfers of land
were first institutionalized with the British land settlements. Legislation introduced in ryotwari
and mahalwari areas during the 1  850s enabled money-lenders to recover debts on loans secured
on land holdings. Since revenue assessments were so high (particularly in ryotwari areas5),
indebtedness grew, and dispossession of land led to rapidly rising tenancy. As a result, rural
society in ryotwari and mahalwari areas was polarized into landlords and rich peasants versus
tenants and agricultural laborers, and the distribution of land became highly unequal 6.
In zamindari areas, rural society was even more hierarchically divided between
landlords, tenants with hereditary rights (raiyats), sub-tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural
laborers, and land distribution was even more unequal than in ryotwari areas. Early tenancy
legislation (Bengal Rent Act, 1859; Bengal Tenancy Act, 1855) established occupancy rights for
raiyats in zamindari areas, and attempted (with little success) to limit rents paid by sub-tenants
and sharecroppers to 50 per cent of gross produce with written agreement and 25 per cent if not.
In ryotwari areas, however, tenancy was not officially recognized or regulated by the colonial
regime and no action was taken to stem the flow of distress sales, dispossessions and evictions
until the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. By the time of independence, some 40 per cent of the total
rural population of India were landless agricultural laborers.
Table 2 presents a typology of states according to the type of tenure system they
inherited. Data are also shown on the growth of agricultural production over the period 1970-94.
The intention is not to suggest that the legacy of former land settlements has any direct causal
relationship with contemporary agricultural performance. It does reveal, however, that former
ryotwari and mahalwari areas of South and West India have tended to show higher rates of
agricultural growth than have former zamindari areas of North and East India. There are notable
exceptions, of course, since agricultural performance is influenced by many factors other than
inherited tenure systems. Two notable land reform states stand out as outliers: Kerala has
performed less well than most former ryotwari areas, while West Bengal has performed better
than all other former zamindari areas and ryotwari areas. Nonetheless, the contention that the
legacy of inherited tenure systems can have lasting impacts is also borne out by micro-level
5Initial  assessments  were so high  that they often  constituted  the entire  economic  rent from land. Re-
assessments  made in 1860  in Bombay  and 1855  in Madras  (which  continued  until 1937)  led to even
higher land  revenues,  resulting  in famine  and prompting  agrarian  revolts  (Sharma 1  992a).
6 The Royal  Commission  on Agriculture,  1924-25,  reported  that in Bombay,  86 per cent of the cultivated
area was held by 12 per cent of the cultivators.  In Punjab  by 1939,  2 per cent of land  owners  held 38
per cent of cultivated  land.
8evidence from village studies. In Gujarat, for example, the consequences of the green and 'white'
(dairying) revolutions have been shown to be more equitable and pro-poor in former ryotwari
villages than in former zamindari villages (Singh 1985). The evidence from Orissa also suggests
that land records tend to be more accurate in ryotwari areas as compared with zamindari areas
(Mearns and Sinha 1998).
Table 2  Typology of states by tenure system and agricultural growth rate
Tenure system, State  Average annual growth
in agricultural
production,  1970-94 (°/)
Zamindari (57% cultivated area)
Uttar Pradesh (except Avadh & Agra)  1.9
Bihar  1.5
Orissa  2.6
West Bengal  4.4
Rajasthan  1.1
Andhra Pradesh (Telengana)  X
Ryotwari (38% cultivated area)
Karnataka  2.7
Gujarat  2.0
Tamil Nadu  1.6
Kerala  0.7
Maharashtra  2.7
Madhya Pradesh (60% area)  1.6
Andhra Pradesh (except Telengana)  2.7
Assam_  -0.4
Rajasthan (Jaipur & Jodhpur)  _
Mahalwari (5% cultivated area)
Punjab  4.5
Haryana  2.4
Madhya Pradesh (40% area)  1.6
Orissa (9% area)  _
Uttar Pradesh (Avadh & Agra)
All-India  2.1
Sources:  Sharma  (1992a)  for tenure  systems;  Fan, Hazell  and Thorat  (1998) for
agricultural  production  data
POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF LAND  REFORMS
Land was made a 'state subject' by the Government of India in 1935. As a result, under
the Indian Constitution, land reform is the responsibility of individual states, although central
guidance is offered at federal level. The nature of the legislation, the level of support or otherwise
from existing or new institutional arrangements, and the degree of success in implementation
have varied significantly from state to state. Annex 1 summarizes some key features of land
9reformn  legislation by state, focusing chiefly on ceilings on agricultural holdings 7, some of the key
provisions concerning tenancy, and progress in land consolidation. This brief review is by no
means exhaustive, however. Further work is required to understand the practical operation of
land legislation in selected states and its consequences for the rural poor and socially excluded.
Broadly speaking, three major types of land reform legislation have been enacted after
independence, though not all of these have been enacted in all states: the abolition of
intermediary tenures; regulation of the size of holdings (through ceiling-surplus redistribution
and/or land consolidation); and the settlement and regulation of tenancy (Ray 1996, Appu 1997).
The stated intentions of these reforms, justified on grounds of both social justice  and economic
efficiency in agriculture, were to transfer land 'to the tiller'  (often entailing a dejure  if not de
facto  ban on landlord-tenant relations), to increase security of tenure for tenants (through
registration of informal, oral tenancy agreements; conversion of continuous tenancies into
ownership rights), and to regulate rents paid by tenants.
The political reality behind these reforms, however, is that they were generally
promulgated by ruling elites composed of or electorally dependent on the upper echelons of
agrarian society (Herring  1983). The abolition of intermediaries during the 1950s was more
completely and easily achieved than subsequent reforms owing to political expediency: it brought
substantial gains to many at relatively low political cost. Paradoxically, many of the beneficiaries
of the abolition of intermediaries (former upper and middle caste tenants) are now among those
politically visible, larger landowners who bitterly oppose ceilings on land holdings (Ray 1996).
Moreover, the cost of the abolition of intermediaries was high: the heavy compensation paid to
former zamindars enabled many of them to become rich agro-industrialists, and many acquired
ownership rights over land they did not previously own. These early reforms left substantially
unchanged the inequalities in land holdings and the precarious position of sharecroppers and
agricultural laborers.
It is conventionally thought that ceiling-redistributive reforms in India have achieved
little. For example, Ray (1996) estimates that over a period of 35 years ceilings have been
enforced and land redistributed on less than 2 per cent of the total operated area. Ceilings were
frequently set too high in relation to the average size of household operational holdings to have
much impact on the agrarian structure in most states. Various exemptions and loopholes left by
individual states allowed landlords to retain control over land holdings, most infamously through
benami transactions whereby village record-keepers (patwaris) could be bribed to register
holdings in the names of deceased or fictitious persons. The lack of accurate, updated records of
rights in land is widely noted to be a major constraint on the effective implementation of ceiling-
redistributive and tenancy reforms. However, the threat of ceilings does seem to have prevented
the further expansion of large holdings, and there is little doubt that the redistribution of even
very small plots of homestead land has brought substantial benefits to the poor. Some states have
achieved much greater progress than others in implementing ceiling-redistributive reforms:
Jammu and Kashmir has redistributed 17 per cent of its operated area, West Bengal 6 per cent,
and Assam 5 per cent.
All land ceilings  acts have a sliding  scale  of ceilings  according  to land quality;  only  the lowest  ceiling is
indicated  here. In Rajasthan,  for example,  ceilings  in desert areas  are as high as 70 ha.
10A relatively neglected issue in the massive literature on Indian land reforms is state-
initiated land consolidation. Not all agree that it constitutes true 'land reform',  as by design it
usually attempts scrupulously to leave unchanged the distribution of land. Without redistribution,
land consolidation stands to benefit those with larger land holdings more than those with smaller
holdings, since the opportunity costs of land fragmentation are higher the larger the farm. Where
agroecological conditions and institutional design have been conducive to success, however, as in
Uttar Pradesh, land consolidation programs have reportedly led to reduced dependency for many
farmers, and have increased the economic viability of many farms (Oldenburg 1990). Overall,
around a third of the total operated area in India was reported to have been consolidated by the
mid- 1980s, almost all of which was in Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh (Thangaraj  1995)8.  In these states, land consolidation was achieved through state
programs. The legacy of mahalwari tenure systems may have made the task of land consolidation
easier in Punjab and Haryana, although agroecological conditions here were also more favorable.
In other states (Tamil Nadu, Kerala) no legislative provision exists for land consolidation, yet
some consolidation has been achieved through spontaneous exchanges by farmers themselves in
the land market.
The implementation of tenancy reforms has generally been weak, non-existent or
counterproductive, resulting in the eviction of tenants, their rotation among landlords'  plots to
prevent them acquiring occupancy rights, and a general worsening of their tenure security (Appu
1997)9.  Legislation that attempts to ban tenancy (leasing) outright, as in Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and
Madhya Pradesh (albeit with certain exceptions), has particularly perverse effects. It inevitably
leads to concealed tenancy arrangements that tend to be even more informal, shorter (increasingly
seasonal), and less secure than they had been prior to reform. In other states (Bihar, Rajasthan),
although tenancy is not prohibited, no legal provision exists to record informal tenancies. The
registration and protection of informal tenancies has taken place only in West Bengal, and to a
lesser extent in Tamil Nadu and Vidharbha area of Maharashtra. By 1992, according to one
commentator, ownership rights had been conferred and tenancies protected on no more than 4 per
cent of the total operated area (chiefly in Assam, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala,
Maharashtra, and West Bengal). The net result of tenancy reforms is said to have been the loss of
access by the rural poor to around 30 per cent of the total operated area (Ray 1996).
But this does not mean that legal reforms designed to increase tenure security for tenants
are bound to fail, provided sufficient attention is paid to the institutional conditions required for
their successful implementation, and provided the balance of power shifts sufficiently in favor of
tenants. The success of Operation Barga in West Bengal after 1977, through which tenants could
exercise the right to register their tenancies and have their legal entitlement to higher crop shares
enforced, has been widely acclaimed as the principal cause of the rapid growth in agricultural
productivity in the state since the early 1980s (Banerjee and Ghatak 1996, Lieten 1996)10. In the
8 Official  data on progress  with land  reforms  are often  suspect,  however,  as our study  in Orissa  shows
(Mearns  and Sinha 1998).  While  the administrative  process  may have been completed,  there may still
be resistance  to the actual exchange  of plots among  farmers.
9 International  experience  suggests  that tenancy  reform  without  the credible  threat of enforcing  ceilings  on
land holdings  usually  harms  the poor (e.g.  Philippines),  but usually  benefits  the poor where  ceilings
are enforced  (e.g.  Taiwan,  South  Korea).
10  This is disputed  by some (e.g.  Harriss  1993)  who suggest  that productivity  growth is attributable  more  to
rising private  investment  in groundwater  irrigation  than to land  reforms.
11West Bengal case, the most notable aspect of the reform process was not legislative change -
many of the central provisions had been on the statute books since the 1950s - but political
change at the state level, reinforced by effective institutions at local level. With popular support
from panchayati raj institutions and local political representative bodies, well-publicized land
settlement camps moved from village to village, updating land records and offering tenants the
right to register their tenancies at the same time. This concerted effort between government and
citizens' representative bodies helped to bring about a significant shift in the bargaining power of
tenants in relation to landlords which was ultimately the key to success".
Tenancy reforms are clearly of continuing relevance in reducing poverty. Two elements
are of particular importance, involving both legal and institutional reforms. First, deregulation of
land-lease markets is important where attempts are made to ban tenancy outright, since this
exacerbates tenure insecurity for tenants. Second is the registration and protection of informal,
concealed tenancies along the lines of the West Bengal model. More generally, three critical
ingredients of success in implementing reforms in land administration stand out: the importance
of collective action at local level, the public nature of proceedings, and state power exercised on
behalf of the socially excluded. This is as true of land consolidation in Uttar Pradesh as it is of
tenancy reforms in West Bengal, and offers valuable lessons from which to learn in broader
efforts to improve land settlement, adjudication and registration.
In the first quantitative study of its kind in India, Besley and Burgess (1998) investigated
the relationship between land reforms and poverty reduction at state level, using panel data for
the sixteen major states. Their main conclusion is that land reforms do indeed appear to have led
to reductions in poverty in India. In their analysis, the authors controlled for other factors that
may be associated with poverty reduction, in order to rule out the possibility that land reform
activity merely serves as a proxy for other policies1 2. Their detailed analysis finds that while
skepticism is warranted with respect to the prospects for redistributing land through land ceilings,
the abolition of intermediaries and tenancy reforms (at least in some states) appear to have been
more successful in reducing poverty. These findings accord reasonably well with existing,
empirically based assessments of the relative success of Indian land reforms.
A NOTE ON DATA
Most published accounts of the size distribution of rural land holdings (e.g. Sharma
1994) use aggregate data from the National Sample Survey (NSS). Aggregate data from
agricultural censuses and surveys (e.g. NSS), however, do not present a reliable picture of land
distribution, the extent of tenancy, or the terms of tenancy contracts, since landlords tend to
lIt  is also suggested  that sharp  caste  polarization  in West  Bengal  allowed  reforms  to be promulgated  as
'class' reforms  without  becoming  embroiled  in the more  contentious  arena  of caste  politics
(T.V.Somanathan,  pers. comm.).
12 The specification  of the land  reformn  variable  in their analysis  raises concerns,  however.  States are
'classified  as high land  reform  or low  land  reform  depending  on whether  they had more  or less than a
total of three land  reforms  (of any  type)  during  the 1958-92  period'. Thus,  the cumulative  volume  of
legislation  enacted  is taken as the measure  of actual  change  in practice.
12under-report size of holdings and extent of tenancy and to over-report the crop share of tenants".
Village studies report more land under tenancy than does the NSS, and show a smaller excess of
reported leased-in over leased-out land (Jayaraman and Lanjouw 1998). Aside from questionable
accuracy owing to reporting biases, survey data tend to overstate land inequality and need to be
corrected for household size and land quality. Households with smaller holdings also tend to have
fewer members, which relates in part to the lifecycle effect of subdivision upon inheritance.
Smaller holdings tend to be cropped more intensively and have a higher percentage of total area
under irrigation. Inequality in income potential is therefore reduced within a given region than the
aggregate data suggest, while differences in agro-ecological potential mean comparisons between
regions are also suspect.
Data on landlessness need to be interpreted with care. There are four main definitions:
households owning no land, those who operate no land, those who neither own nor operate any
land, and rural households who rely principally on wage employment. These categories typically
overlap but are not identical; the differences are important with respect to control over assets and
livelihood sources, and in terms of their policy implications. It is important to distinguish
underlying causes of landlessness in terms of push factors (demographic pressure inducing some
marginal landowners to lease out or sell their land, distress sales owing to indebtedness or other
contingencies, ejection of tenants to evade provisions of tenancy acts or to allow landlords to
resume self-cultivation using new technology), or pull factors (growth in non-farm employment
opportunities). Some (e.g. Singh 1990) suggest that the growth in landlessness during the 1970s
in agriculturally progressive states (Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat) is no cause for alarm on the
grounds that it merely reflects the growing dynamism of the rural non-farm sector.
The aggregate data also fail to offer insights into the operation of land markets. Land
transfers come about through subdivision (legal and customary), gifts (usually within families,
see Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985), sales, and redistribution under land reform legislation, but
these are difficult to distinguish in aggregate data. To understand land transactions fully,
longitudinal village studies are required, tracing who transfers land to whom, why, and on what
terms, informed by local histories of changing agrarian conditions (Jayaraman and Lanjouw
1998).
SIZE DISTRIBUTION  OF RURAL  LAND HOLDINGS
Gross inequities in land ownership in rural India have persisted since independence in
spite of the tendency for population pressure to bring about a more even distribution of
holdings 14. But this should not divert attention from the important structural changes that have
taken place: the number of small/marginal owners, the total area they owned, and the average size
of their holdings have increased, while the importance of large farms has decreased. The number
and proportion of households owning no land has declined significantly since independence,
13 Indian  data, however,  are generally  believed  to be better  than those for other South  Asian  countries
(Singh 1990).
4 Besley  and Burgess  (1998)  found  that  the gini coefficient  for land distribution  declined  from 0.686  in
1953/54  to  just 0.669 in 1982,  even in 'high land  reform' states.  This  places India  in the middle  range
of land inequality  by international  standards.  Latin  American  countries  generally  have much higher
land inequality  (Deininger  and Squire  1996).
13mostly due to the abolition of internediaries  during the 1950s. Little real change in landlessness
has taken place since then. It is generally agreed that subdivision of landholdings and the
sale/purchase of land have been more important in bringing about structural redistribution than
have redistributive land reforrns, although land reforms have brought substantial gains to many
poor rural households, particularly in Kerala (with mixed effects) and West Bengal. Indeed, the
land redistribution that has been brought about through the market is partly attributable to land
reforms, where there has been a credible threat of ceilings enforcement. Table 3 summarizes
some salient features of India's  agrarian structure. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relative shifts in
distribution of ownership holdings and share of owned area by size of holding since
independence.
Table  3  Key parameters in India's agrarian structure
Parameters  1961-62  1971-72  1982  1992
Estimated number of rural households (millions)  72.5  77.8  93.9  n/a
Share not owning any land (%)  11.7  9.6  11.3  n/a
Share not operating any land (%)  26.8  27.0  24.0  n/a
Gini coefficient for ownership holdings  0.73  0.71  0.71  n/a
Gini coefficient for operational holdings  0.58  0.59  0.63  n/a
Share of landowning households leasing out (%)  7.0  9.9  6.2  n/a
Share of owned area leased out (%)  4.4  5.8  4.3  5.0
Share of operating households leasing in (%)  23.8  25.2  14.7  15.0
Share of operational area leased in (%)  10.7  10.6  7.2  9.0
Sources:  Vaidyanathan  (1994),  based on data from Sarvekshana  11(2),  1987,  and 12(1),  1988;  and GOI
(1997b)
Fig 1 Distribution  of household  ownership
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One would expect the distribution of operational holdings to be less skewed than
ownership holdings, on the assumption that larger owners generally rent land to smaller ones.
While this is generally true, ground reality is more complex, and landlords and tenants cannot be
divided into mutually exclusive classes (cf. Neale 1990). Many with relatively large operational
holdings lease-in land from smaller owners (the phenomenon of so-called 'reverse tenancy').
Where there has been rapid technological change (Haryana, Punjab) operational holdings have
become more concentrated owing to the displacement of tenants, increase in hired labor, and
diversification of assets away from land, especially in irrigated areas. At least until the early
1980s, the following trends could be observed from all-India data. Although operational land
remains very unequally distributed, inequality has lessened over time. The number of small and
marginal operational holdings has increased owing to population growth and subdivision,
particularly in the northern (former zamindari) states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West
Bengal, but the average size of marginal holdings also increased. Larger holdings fell
proportionately in number and area but their average size did not decline. The most significant
net gains overall were for medium holdings, except in Kerala. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the
changing structure of operational holdings and share of total area operated by size of holding
since independence.
Fig 3  Distribution  of household  operational
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LANDLESSNESS AND ABSENTEE LAND OWNERSHIP
There is a widespread perception that landlessness has increased over the last few
decades. While this is true in terms of absolute numbers, in relative terms the incidence of
landlessness has not changed significantly since the 1960s in terms of ownership or operational
holdings (see Table 3). For India as a whole, the share of households not owning any land
remained at around 11 per cent in 1982, while the share of households not operating any land fell
slightly from 27 per cent to 24 per cent. However, the share of households owning sub-marginal
holdings - often simply homestead land - doubled between 1961-62 and  1982 (from  17 per cent
to 32 per cent), in part through the redistribution of ceiling-surplus land.
Commentators vary in their interpretations of the significance of these trends. Chadha
(1994), for example, recalculates NSS data on the share of households owning no land to include
those with only homestead land but no arable land. On this basis he finds that functional
landlessness has increased in relative terms since 1953-54 in most states, particularly in
agriculturally progressive states (Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh,
Maharashtra), and has fallen only in Assam, Kerala, and Rajasthan. On this view, land reforms
have had little net impact, as they tended to redistribute only very small land parcels, while
increased land market (sale-purchase) transactions in the 1970s (by recipients of ceiling-surplus
land, among others) added to the share of rural households owning no arable land. Others (e.g.
Agarwal 1994) draw attention to the fact that households owning even tiny holdings are
significantly less likely to experience absolute poverty. A land base, however small, is argued to
offer some security, collateral, and opportunities to increase incomes through livestock
production or other land-based activities.
Lipton (1985) finds that it is only with respect to reliably watered land that even tiny
holdings significantly reduce poverty risk (e.g. in states such as Andhra Pradesh or West Bengal).
Using NSS data, confirmed by village studies, Lipton argues that where land is of poor quality or
is ill-watered (as in Rajasthan or Gujarat), households with unirrigated, sub-marginal holdings
still face a significant risk of transient poverty associated with variable rainfall. The clear
implication is that land reform is most needed precisely where it is opposed (i.e. where land is
best). Nonetheless, the incidence of chronic poverty among landless farm laborers is still much
higher than among average landed persons.
16The share of households owning but not operating any land also remained constant at
around 17 per cent over 1961-62 to 1982. This generalization masks considerable variation
between states and between types of households within states, however. It is a misnomer to refer
to this group as a 'rentier class' as it includes households owning but leasing out very small
holdings in order to work as wage laborers in or outside agriculture (and for whom the
transaction costs of leasing-in additional land prove prohibitive), as well as larger, absentee
landowners. In 1982, the share of non-operating landowners was large in Punjab, Haryana, Tamil
Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh, at around a quarter of all households, and small in Kerala and
Rajasthan (5 per cent or less). However, it grew in size only in three states (Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Tamil Nadu) between 1961-62 and 1982; elsewhere it declined" 5. This implies an increasing trend
towards self-cultivation and is likely to reflect constraints in land-lease markets. These
constraints appear to be most severe for those without land or with only sub-marginal holdings
who wish to lease-in land, and signal the need for the deregulation of lease markets.
The proportion of households neither owning nor operating land is considerably smaller,
and remained constant at around 9 per cent between 1961-62 and 1982 for All-India, having
fallen slightly in the intervening years. Again, the All-India average masks considerable variation
between states. The relative strength of this group showed a marked decline in Uttar Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu and Assam; fell slightly in Punjab, Haryana, Bihar and Kerala; remained unchanged
in Kamataka, Orissa and West Bengal; and increased elsewhere. For this group, it is clear that
wage employment opportunities need to increase substantially, and it is likely that the rural non-
farm sector will have a increasingly decisive role to play.
In Kerala, most agricultural laborers also own some land. Elsewhere, agricultural labor
households are fairly evenly divided between those with land and those without, although in
agriculturally progressive states (e.g. Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu) they generally do
not own land. The absolute number and share of population primarily dependent on wage
employment have increased over time practically everywhere, partly owing to population
increase and partly owing to downward mobility. There is a high correspondence between this
group of households and the incidence of rural poverty, particularly in states in which agricultural
growth is low.
FARM SIZE AND PRODUCTIVITY
There is mounting evidence from around the world that agricultural productivity is
inversely related to farm size, on the grounds that small farms using family labor have significant
advantages in reducing labor-related transaction costs and achieving higher intensity of work
effort per hectare (Berry and Cline 1979, Feder 1985, Lipton 1993). However, the Indian
literature is replete with studies that arguably contest this inverse relationship (e.g. Bhalla and
Roy 1988). Much of the confusion stems from the fact that pervasive policy distortions in Indian
agriculture have led to continuing biases towards large farmers in infrastructure development,
support services and markets for credit and complementary inputs, thus disguising the underlying
relative efficiencies of small versus large farms. Many holdings in India are simply too small to
be economically viable in the existing policy environment, and given indivisible inputs (family
'5 Since 1982,  it is reported  that  absentee  landownership  in Tamil  Nadu  has fallen  sharply,  signifying  the
loss of control of land  by upper  castes,  while it has increased  in Kerala (Vaidyanathan  1994).
17labor, draft animals). Little research has been carried out that controls sufficiently for the effects
of policy distortions'6
Taking policy distortions into account, the conventional wisdom is that the Green
Revolution sabotaged the inverse relationship (IR) between farm size and productivity in rural
India. It appeared from aggregate data for the 1970s that there were significant economies of
scale in agriculture that enabled large farmers to be more productive per unit area than small
farmers. However, assessments based on more recent data suggest that this reflected the earlier
adoption of new agricultural technology by large farmers, and that as the benefits of the Green
Revolution trickled down to small farmers during the 1980s the IR has been restored. While large
farmers face lower capital-related transaction costs, the new agricultural technology in India now
appears to be scale-neutral, and the advantages enjoyed by small farmers in reducing labor-
related transaction costs are thought to be of greater overall significance, enabling them to be
show higher productivity per unit area (corrected for land quality).
One recent study found that after government spending on agricultural research and
extension, relative equality in the distribution of operational holdings was the second most
important determinant of total factor productivity in Indian agriculture (Desai 1997). Greater
equality in ownership holdings was also an important, though less significant factor. These results
are consistent with the IR between productivity and farm size and support the case for improving
access to land by the rural poor as part of a strategy for rural growth-with-equity. A priority for
future research is to disentangle the effects of policy distortions using recent data so as to permit
an overall assessment of the relationship between farm size and productivity in the Indian
17 context
16 A separate  but still relevant  issue  is to consider  the size-profitability  relationship,  and the link with  high
rates of farmer  suicide  in commercial  areas  of Andhra  Pradesh  (Reddy 1993).
17 Fan, Hazell  and Thorat  (1998) have  examined  interlinkages  between  government  spending,  growth  and
poverty  in rural India  and find,  for example,  high  returns  to investment  in rural  roads,  both for growth
and for poverty  reduction.  They  did not examine  the influence  of land  distribution  over growth and
poverty  reduction,  however,  owing  to the lack of recent  data. The IFPRI  team expects  to obtain  data
on land distribution  up to the early 1990s  later  this year, which  will enable  them to test the hypothesis
that  more equal land distribution  generates  both  higher  growth and greater  poverty  reduction.
184  KEY POLICY  ISSUES
LAND  MARKETS
If small  yet economically  viable, family  farms are more efficient  than large  farms, one
would expect  the land market  to re-allocate  land in their favor, whether  permanently  (through
sale or purchase)  or temporarily  (through  leasing  or other  forms of tenancy).  The matching  of
land, labor  and capital endowments  could, in theory,  be brought about  through activity in one or
more of these  markets.  In rural India,  however,  such  markets  are highly  incomplete,  imperfect
and often  (though decreasingly)  interlinked,  resulting  among  other  things in the persistence  of
marginal  and sub-marginal  operational  holdings  which  can neither  be easily added  to nor
disposed  of18. Most notable among  the land  market imperfections,  and which appear  to offer most
feasible promise  of reduction  through  public  action, are those that result from legislative
restrictions  on leasing  and tenancy,  ostensibly  designed  to protect  the poor but frequently  having
precisely  the opposite  effect;  and the heavy  transaction  costs in land sale-purchase  markets  that
fall disproportionately  on the rural poor. The high cost of land  market transactions  is discussed
below in relation  to records  of rights in land.
In addition  to transaction  costs, a further  reason  why land sale-purchase  markets in India
are so 'sticky' is related to the broader  social  value of land  which considerably  exceeds  its direct
economic  value in terms of capitalized  farm profits.  There are several  dimensions  to this. Land is
the most durable  of assets, and land  prices  have considerably  outstripped  the rate of inflation.
Land is valued as collateral  and provides  security  against  natural hazards  (droughts,  floods) and
other contingencies  (dowry,  funeral  costs).  It is of symbolic  importance,  and land  ownership
brings a sense of identity  and rootedness  within  a village  (Agarwal 1994).  However,  land is also a
source  of political power  (Neale 1969),  which in turn 'provides  the means  to enhance  the return
from land' (Faruqee  and Carey 1997: 13).  It is this power  structure  that underlies  continuing  price
distortions  and institutional  biases  towards  large farmers,  whether  in infrastructure  provision
(notably  water) or access  to credit, inputs  or support  services,  and at the same blocks attempts  to
reform  the land market. This combination  of factors  explains  why  there are so few willing sellers
of land under prevailing conditions in rural India'9.
Given these rigidities in the land sale-purchase market in much of rural India, one would
expect the lease market to play an important role in matching land, labor and capital endowments
(Bell 1990, Melmed-Sanjak 1998, Sadoulet et al. 1998). Land leasing or tenancy may take the
form of fixed rentals or sharecropping arrangements, in which rents are paid in cash, in kind, or a
combination of the two. Regardless of the type of tenancy contract, what is the evidence on the
18 See Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig  (1986)  for the theoretical  explanation  why under  poorly  developed
capital  markets  land is sold mainly  for distress  reasons,  and  why it tends to accumulate  with  those
already  having  large holdings.
19  Carter  and  Mesbah  (1993) consider  other  possible  explanations  for missing land  market  transactions
(which  they term the 'Chicago  question') in addition  to land  market  imperfections.  These  include:  the
feudal  hypothesis  (lack of interest  in profit maximization);  the price distortions  hypothesis  (distorted
price policy  lends an artificial  competitive  advantage  to large-scale  agriculture);  the inadequate  farm
savings  hypothesis  (small  farms  cannot generate  surplus  over subsistence  requirements);  and the
capital  constraints  hypothesis  (operating  capital  is required  as well as capital for land  purchase,  which
weakens the IR in imperfect capital markets). All apply, to varying degrees, in India.
19changing significance of land-lease markets in rural India? Tenancy has declined substantially in
rural India since independence when it accounted for around 75 per cent of the total cultivated
area (Sharma 1  992a). While the under-reporting of tenancies means aggregate data (as shown in
table 3) are of doubtful value in assessing the changing significance of tenancy, there is little
doubt that real rates of tenancy have declined, in part owing to legislative regulation; and in part
owing to technological change in agriculture, leading to the resumption of self-cultivation by
larger landowners, and the leasing-out by marginal owners as holdings became non-viable in the
context of new agricultural technology 20.
Nonetheless, lease markets remain of great importance for the rural poor (Sadoulet et al.
1998). Of an estimated 19 per cent of rural households that lease-in land, over 90 per cent are
landless or marginal owners (Parthasarthy 1991). Most of those leasing-out land are also small
owners, either because they have too little family labor or draft power to operate the land, or
because they have access to alternative, non land-based livelihood opportunities. However, the
numbers of landless, marginal and small operators seeking to lease-in land far outweigh those
marginal and small operators that lease-out land. Half of the total area leased-in is by landless and
marginal operators (significantly exceeding the area of ceiling-surplus land redistributed) and a
further 20 per cent by small owners (Parthsarthy 1991). The ratio of land leased-in to owned land
is much larger for smaller farmers than for larger farmers; in spite of growing reverse tenancy,
therefore, leasing out by larger operators remains the dominant pattern. Discriminatory policies
have had important consequences for the extent and character of lease markets, and not only in
those states that legally prohibit leasing or tenancy (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh). Many more
households would lease land if legal restrictions were eased and transaction costs lowered,
subject to supply/demand factors which vary by season, and according to individual capabilities
and other attributes. Olson Lanjouw (1998), for example, demonstrates that farming skill can be a
significant factor influencing how much land may be leased-in.
The extent and character of land-lease markets vary widely between states and regions of
India. Two groups of states account for the highest tenancy rates. Most significant of all are the
less agriculturally developed, former zamindari states of North and East India (Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal) which account for 65 per cent of all tenants, and which also
generally record a higher than average incidence of rural poverty. Share tenancies tend to
predominate in these states, although the trend is towards fixed-rent tenancies 21. The second'
group includes the agriculturally progressive states of Punjab, Haryana and Tamil Nadu. As
markets develop, and in the absence of legal restrictions, sharecropping tends to give way to the
leasing of land on a cash basis, as has happened in these agriculturally more progressive states
(Singh et al. 1991). States with low rates of tenancy include: Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala and Gujarat. Other former ryotwari areas fall in
between these extremes (Assam, Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra).
20 The acquisition  of ownership  rights by tenants  has not been  widespread,  was limited  to a few states (e.g.
Kerala,  Maharashtra,  Gujarat,  Telengana  in Andhra  Pradesh  after peasant  struggle  in the 1  950s), and
benefited  better-off  rather  than poorer  tenants  even in these  places  (Herring  1983).
21 Under  fixed-rent  tenancies,  rents may still  be paid in kind. Legal  restrictions  may apply to such
arrangements:  in West  Bengal  rents are compulsorily  payable  in kind, whereas  in Mumbai  they must
be paid in cash.
20Much tenancy legislation has its origins in the still widely held misconceptions that share
tenancy is necessarily inefficient and that landlord-tenant relations are necessarily exploitative. A
substantial literature now corrects these misconceptions (Otsuka and Hayami 1988, Singh 1990):
share tenancy represents a second-best response to missing, thin and imperfect markets for land,
credit, labor, management, information, and insurance, and performs some very important
functions which would otherwise have to fulfilled by other institutions; it is neither necessarily
inefficient nor a barrier to the adoption of new technology; tenancy contracts are often part of a
series of interlinked, interdependent contracts in a number of factor markets (land, labor, credit).
They are not necessarily exploitative, but where they are, owing to the unequal bargaining power
between agents, attempts to 'fix'  relations in one sphere can lead to compensatory shifts in other
contracts to leave tenants net worse off.
Rather more is known about why sharecropping persists than is known about the
determinants of its relative efficiency in different environments (Faruqee and Carey 1997).
Nonetheless, according to Singh (1990), the weight of evidence suggests that share tenancies are
likely to show inefficiency where tenancies are small (less than 2 ha), cost-sharing is minimal,
technical change and productivity increases are slow, markets of all kinds are imperfectly
developed, and semi-feudal, patron-client systems are prevalent. Such conditions are to be found
predominantly in the former zamindari areas of northeastern India, particularly where share
tenancies are very small and account for half or more of the total cultivated area, as in Bihar,
Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. But this generalization overlooks important differences
between these states.  In Uttar Pradesh, owing to the prohibition on land-lease markets, tenancies
are concealed and highly insecure. In West Bengal, by contrast, a significant proportion of
tenancies are registered and protected, which has had a marked impact on agricultural
performance. Cost-sharing tends to be more prevalent in the former ryotwari areas of southern
and western India, and is increasing in importance in areas significantly affected by the Green
Revolution 22.
Historically, it is thought that land markets have operated to the detriment of small and
marginal farmers in rural India. The imposition of British colonial rule and 19th century land
settlements brought new markets for agricultural products, freely negotiable land rights in
ryotwari areas, and oppressive taxation. This combination of factors resulted in the dispossession
of heavily indebted small cultivators through foreclosures to money lenders in credit markets that
were newly delinked from land and labor markets, leading to a rise in land concentration 23.
Downward mobility of rural households is often presumed to predominate over upward mobility
on the grounds of repeated partitioning of holdings among multiple heirs, but theoretically this
pressure could result in land distribution becoming either more or less concentrated, depdhding
on the characteristics of buyers and sellers, the reasons for sale-purchase transactions (e.g. extent
of distress sales), and access to non land-based income sources.
22 The relative  complexity  of cropping  systems  is also  relevant  to the nature  of tenancy  contracts.
Sharecropping  may be more suitable  under simpler  cropping  systems,  such as paddy production,  than
in more complex  farming  systems  with several  crops  in rotation,  in which fixed-rent  contracts  are
more  likely. The companion  study  in Orissa  considers  variations  in tenancy  contracts  under different
cropping  systems  (Mearns  and Sinha 1998).
23 In fact there is no evidence  of increasing  land concentration  in rural India  since  the mid-  19th  century
(Cambridge  Economic  History  of India, cited in Heston  and  Kumar 1983).
21Recent evidence from longitudinal village studies, however, suggests that by and large
land markets in rural India have operated in favor of small and marginal farmers rather than
against them. Annex 2 distills findings from several studies of sale-purchase transactions over
periods of several decades. While these findings cannot be generalized, several observations are
of broader relevance. Only one study (in Madhya Pradesh) found that sale-purchase transactions
had resulted in more unequal holdings; in this case land transactions were infrequent and, for
small and marginal farmers, were largely distress sales (Sarap 1995). Others observed rather
more active land markets, even in semi-arid areas; identified both upward and downward
mobility of households over time (Attwood 1979); and found little net change in land
concentration (Walker and Ryan 1990, Balabh and Walker 1992, Mani and Gandhi 1994).
Annex 3 reviews the findings from studies of land-lease markets in both agriculturally
progressive areas and semi-arid areas with a lower incidence of irrigated land. Active lease
markets were observed in virtually all cases, even where leasing is legally prohibited (as in Uttar
Pradesh). Households in all holding size groups lease out land, generally to take advantage of
non-agricultural employment opportunities, particularly where household endowments of labor
and draft animals preclude self-cultivation and other markets do not compensate. Reverse
tenancy (larger operators leasing land from smaller owners) appears to be particularly important
in more progressive areas (Punjab, western Uttar Pradesh), while land-labor market interlocking
(larger landowners leasing to landless and marginal farmers in order to take advantage of their
family labor) remains significant in less progressive areas (Bihar, Orissa).
Similarly, households in all holding size groups lease in land, although in many cases
small and marginal operators are disproportionately represented, often but not always linked to
labor contracts. One study explicitly addressed transaction costs as a possible constraint on
leasing-in land, and found that small and marginal farmers were less likely than large farmers to
lease-in as much land as they would have wished, owing to the heavy burden of transaction costs
they faced (Skoufias 1995). Faruqee and Carey (1997) suggest that access to credit may be the
most serious constraint on access to land for smaller operators. One study in Uttar Pradesh found
some evidence, though weak and statistically insignificant, that households with access to credit
are more likely to lease-in land, although access to credit in turn was shown to be determined by
other variables reflecting farm productivity: notably amount of irrigated land and extent of plot
fragmentation (Kochar 1992). Very little interlocking of land and credit markets was observed in
the studies reviewed (Annex 3). In agriculturally more progressive areas, larger operators with
sufficient family labor, capital, and access to irrigation accounted for a significant share of
households leasing in land. In some of these areas, a slight increase in land distribution towards
larger farmers was observed, but generally land-lease markets appear to have led to a more equal
distribution of operational holdings.
FRAGMENTATION  OF  HOLDINGS
The fragmentation of operational holdings into multiple plots is commonly perceived to
be a serious constraint on agricultural productivity in India. High direct and opportunity costs in
cultivation are frequently ascribed to fragmentation, including: the time and energy expended in
moving labor, draft animals, seed, manure and irrigation water from one plot to another, and
bringing harvested crops to a common point; supervision of labor; increased expenses of
irrigation and drainage; difficulty of access to scattered plots; and loss of land in boundaries. The
Indian Planning Commission, for example, estimated that as much as 7-10 per cent of land in
22rural India was lost to boundaries in 1957. Those who draw attention to the potential costs of
fragmentation suggest that it could account for the loss of around 3-10 per cent of net returns to
farming, although farm management studies based on field observations show that adaptive
farming practices significantly reduce these potential costs in practice (Heston and Kumar 1983).
There are differing views on the real significance of fragmentation. Singh (1990), for
example, believes it is a serious problem that warrants serious public policy attention in its own
right, while others (Vaidyanathan 1994, Thangaraj 1995) point out that the process of
fragmentation has been slowing considerably since the 1960s, particularly where land markets
are more active and less regulated. While the number of plots per holding tends to increase with
holding size, all-India data on operational holdings show that the average number of parcels per
holding has declined from 5.7 in 1961-62 to 4.0 in 1982. Given the rate of population increase
over this period (see table 2), this is quite a remarkable decline. However, given that total
operated area has changed little, the average size of each of these parcels of land has also
declined from 0.47 ha in 1961-62 to 0.41 ha in 1982. For operational holdings, there is evidence
that land-lease markets enable farmers to overcome the effects of fragmentation (Ballabh and
Walker 1992, Vaidyanathan 1994).
The chief cause of fragmentation by far is the subdivision of holdings on inheritance. As
with other personal laws, different laws governing inheritance apply to different religious groups,
but both Hindu and Muslim law provides for equal inheritance among sons as heirs. Since their
reform after independence, Hindu personal laws also provide for inheritance by women, but
social norms and customs tend overwhelmingly to prevail, and in practice women's  legal rights in
their parental land tend to pass to their brothers (Agarwal 1995). Various institutional
mechanisms have tended to counteract the driving force of population growth and partible
inheritance, most notably joint family arrangements. Other institutional rules have been important
in dampening fragmentation in particular regions. For example, one system enforced until the
1940s in parts of the British Central Provinces stipulated that a farmer had to obtain a declaration
certificate from each of his brothers before he could sell his land, and brothers had the first option
on prospective land for sale. This practice, known as agrah kriya ('on  request') raised the cost of
transacting land, and stimulated voluntary consolidation through the market (Ballabh and Walker
1992). Overall, in spite of the fact that joint family holdings have increasingly been divided in
recent years, the rate of fragmentation has lagged significantly behind the rate of population
increase.
Four main hypotheses have been advanced to explain the persistence of fragmentation:
(i) risk-spreading is the most common: where soils are spatially heterogeneous or where there
are other reasons for high variance in yields between plots, it makes sense to hold a diversified
portfolio of land parcels to maintain higher net yields over time, and to minimize the risk of zero
or very low yields in the worst years, thus reducing the risk of distress sales and indebtedness;
(ii) labor-spreading: diversification between plots reduces peaks in labor demand throughout the
year, on the expectation that crops in different plots may be at different stages in the cropping
cycle at any given time. This hypothesis is less plausible where cropping cycles vary little
between plots within particular localities, as in paddy rice producing areas (South India, West
Bengal);
23(iii) thin land markets: land serves as an asset or a source of security against contingencies as
well as having productive potential, particularly where land and other markets are poorly
integrated or highly regulated. Holding several, fragmented parcels enables owners to sell or
mortgage discrete portions of their total holdings at any one time;
(iv) high transaction costs: heavy costs in transacting land make it more difficult to achieve
voluntary land consolidation through market exchange. Such costs include the uncertainty
associated with land transactions in heavily regulated markets, where records of rights in land are
inaccurate or falsified, and the costs of producing certified copies of documents, and so on. In the
context of poorly developed land markets, voluntary exchanges are also made more difficult in
the absence of reliable information to enable both parties agree on equivalent values of plots
(Heston and Kumar 1983)24.
There is significant regional variation in the incidence of fragmentation, and in the likely
explanations for its evolution and persistence. The major contrast is between the Northern plains
(e.g. PuAjab,  Haryana, Uttar Pradesh) where the spatial heterogeneity of soils is comparatively
low, and the dry Deccan Plateau (e.g. Kamataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat) where it is high. The
risk-spreading hypothesis applies with greater force to the dry Deccan plateau than to the
Northern plains, owing to the higher variation in yields between plots in drier areas where soils
are more heterogeneous (Ballabh and Walker 1992). Certainly by the time of independence, the
extent of fragmentation was a more severe problem in North India than in other parts of the
country. Prior to the successful land consolidation programs in Punjab, Haryana and Uttar
Pradesh, for example, initial holdings were typically made up of 15 to 20 plots, in contrast to
areas of the Deccan Plateau holdings were made up of only 3 to 5 plots. By the late 1970s,
fragmentation remained highest in Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, where small
and marginal holdings recorded up to 8-10 plots (Singh 1990).
Historical and institutional factors, as well as ecological ones, underlie this regional
contrast. It has been suggested that the pattern of British land settlement in northern zamindari
and mahalwari areas led to rapid division of plots, whereas in other areas adaptive mechanisms
prevented excessive fragmentation (Heston and Kumar 1983). Kessinger (1974) argues that 19th
century land settlements in mahalwari areas (Punjab, Haryana) made the task of voluntary land
consolidation much more difficult, as it raised significantly the transaction costs of transferring
land. At the same time, it is possible that administrative land consolidation programs
subsequently found greater acceptance in mahalwari areas (e.g. Punjab since the 1930s), since
the notion of establishing equivalent values of diverse plots was already familiar to local farmers.
By the mid-1980s, around a third of the total operated area in India had come under some
sort of administrative land consolidation program, almost all of which was in Punjab, Haryana,
24 It is worth  noting  that different  methods  for land  valuation  have  been used in land  consolidation
programs.  Market  prices  are of little  use where  there are thin markets.  During  the early  stages  of land
consolidation  in Uttar  Pradesh,  revenue  rates also  proved  to be highly  controversial  as a guide to land
values:  farmers  frequently  contested  the absolute  valuations  attached  to individual  land parcels.  A
significant  degree of success  was subsequently  achieved  using  a scoring  system  to award  relative
rather  than absolute  values  to different  plots within a village  on the basis of perceived  differences  in
productivity,  implemented  through  an open and transparent  process  with the involvement  of both
local farmers  and land settlement  officers  (Oldenburg  1990).
24Uttar Pradesh, and Maharashtra (Thangaraj 1995). Of the more recent programs,  Maharashtra
has made less progress than Uttar Pradesh, perhaps because in Maharashtra soils tend to be more
heterogeneous and because the extent of fragmentation was lower to begin with, thereby reducing
effective demand for consolidation from farmers. Some work towards administrative land
consolidation has been carried out in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Orissa (Mearns and Sinha 1998) and Rajasthan, and almost none in West Bengal and
Assam, in spite of the fact that supporting legislation has already been enacted. In South India, it
is suggested that there may be less to gain from administrative land consolidation because the
extent of fragmentation is lower, voluntary consolidation has more easily been achieved, or
because there are sound ecological reasons for its persistence (cf. Farmer 1960). Notably, Tamil
Nadu and Kerala made no legislative provision for land consolidation programs, but in both states
spontaneous consolidation has been possible through the land market (Thangaraj 1995).
Everywhere, however, the high transaction costs of land transfers (discussed below in relation to
records of rights in land) are significant constraints on voluntary consolidation of ownership
holdings. Overall, it appears that measures to deregulate land markets may indirectly result in
more land consolidation than would further administrative efforts to implement land
consolidation programs directly.
GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS
No discussion of constraints on access to land for socially excluded groups in India can
be complete without considering the lack of effective, independent land rights exercised by
women. A focus on rural poverty reduction alone will fail to uncover the full extent of the social
exclusion of women in gaining access to land, whether through inheritance, through state land
redistribution, or through the market. Female workforce participation rates, rather than property
rights, are widely used as the main indicator of women's economic status in India (Agarwal
1995). But while better employment opportunities may complement land-based opportunities,
they cannot substitute for land. Efforts to diversify livelihoods of asset-poor rural households
through small-scale livestock production and sericulture, for example, generally require some
land base, however small.
In India, separate personal laws apply to different religious groups. In most cases, women
enjoy rather far-reaching legal rights to inherit and own land. This is especially true for Hindu
women following the introduction of the gender-progressive Hindu Succession Act 1956, which
provides for the daughters, widow and mother of a Hindu man dying intestate to inherit property
25 equally with his sons in his separate property  . In practice, however, significant and persistent
gaps persist between women's  legal rights and their actual ownership of land, and between the
limited ownership rights women do enjoy and their effective control over land. Women's  legal
rights in land conflict with deep-seated social norms and customs, and are rarely recognized
socially to be legitimate. There are strong pressures on women to forfeit their legal rights in favor
25 Significant  gender  biases  persist  both in land reform  legislation  and in personal  laws,  however.
Agricultural  land  subject  to tenancy  is exempt  from the Hindu  Succession  Act,  and is governed  by
state-level  acts. In states such  as Uttar  Pradesh  where  tenancy  is officially  banned,  this precludes  most
arable  land.  In the case of land  ceilings  acts,  additional  land  may be kept in  the case  of adult sons  but
not adult daughters.  Also,  in assessing  'family' holdings,  holdings  of both spouses  are considered,  but
women's holdings  are often arbitrarily  declared  as surplus  land  while  men's holdings  remain
untouched  (Agarwal  1995).
25of their brothers, reinforced by social stigma, seclusion practices, and other sanctions. Given the
lack of alternatives, women tend to be dependent on their brothers for economic and social
support in the event of widowhood or marital breakup. As a result, women tend to internalize the
social norms which lead them to forfeit their legal rights in land even without overt pressure from
their relatives. These social obstacles to the exercise of legal rights by women are strongest in
North India (e.g. Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh) and weakest in South India. Even where women do
enjoy ownership rights in name, they may not exercise effective control over land, being unable,
for example, to determine how the land should be used, or to lease, mortgage or dispose of the
land or products from it.
Why is it important that women should have independent land rights? The case in favor
rests on three types of argument: welfare, efficiency, and equality or empowerment (Agarwal
1994a). On welfare grounds, gender-based inequities in well-being are well documented (e.g.
Dreze and Gazdar 1996 for Uttar Pradesh). Women's lack of control over independent sources of
income has implications not just for their own well-being, but also for their children's well-being,
since it is known that child nutritional status is more closely related to women's than men's
income. To the extent that women's  income is land-based, women's lack of access to and
effective control over land may therefore threaten the well-being of many household members.
Poverty and well-being are not necessarily closely correlated: women in better-off and higher-
caste households are also disadvantaged in this respect by their lack of access to and control over
land. On efficiency grounds, women are often the sole or de facto heads of households and, on
the assumption that greater tenure/ title security provides production incentives, granting them
independent title to land is likely to lead to higher agricultural output. However, this is only true
to the extent that existing gender biases in agricultural support services and factor markets are
corrected. Indeed, recent experience with savings and loans groups in India suggests that women
are frequently better credit risks than men.
The equality and empowerment arguments concern women's access to land relative to
that of men, rather than their access to land in absolute terms. Strengthening women's  relative
access to land will help increase their bargaining power and ability to challenge male dominance
both within the household and within the wider community. Some of the most persuasive
arguments relate to women's  ability to escape situations of marital abuse and physical violence.
A common complaint from women against joint land titles, for example, is that they will remain
bound to their husband even in the case of marital breakup. Various social norms and pressures
reinforce women's  relative lack of access to and control over land. In addition to those already
mentioned, intimidation, the threat of violence, and litigation are widely invoked by relatives to
prevent women from pressing legal claims over land (Agarwal 1994a, 1995). The logistics of
dealing with the bureaucratic obstacles to land transfers are particularly formidable for women
who are already disadvantaged through illiteracy, seclusion, social stigma and lack of political
voice. Local government officials also represent major impediments: for example, village record
keepers may refuse to register land holdings in the sole name of widows, only jointly with their
sons. There is evidence that Operation Barga in West Bengal was also biased towards the
registration of male rather than female tenant farmers (Gupta 1993), in spite of its success in
other respects.
In view of such deeply embedded obstacles, what policy approaches hold most promise
in securing better access to and control over land for women in rural India? Further legal reform
may be worthwhile in some cases. Much land reform legislation was enacted before women's
land rights were considered worthy of policy attention in their own right, during the 1980s
26(Agarwal 1994a). No mention of women's land rights was made until the Sixth Five-Year Plan
(1980-85). The Eighth Plan (1990-95) called for a change in inheritance laws to accommodate
women's rights but gave few specifics, and called upon state governments to allot 40 per cent of
ceiling-surplus or state-redistributed land in the name of women alone, with the remainder to be
joint titled. In practice, however, the amount of arable land subject to ceiling-surplus or state
redistribution is insignificant by comparison with potential land transfers through inheritance or
through the market. Any future efforts towards land registration more generally should certainly
attempt to expand the incidence of independent land titles held by women.
While these are steps in the right direction, such legal and policy reforms do little or
nothing to challenge the underlying social norms and customs that inhibit women's access to
land. Agarwal (1994a, 1994b) suggests that granting land rights to groups of landless women is
perhaps the most promising course of action, with NGOs playing a central catalytic role. Some
precedents do exist, such as the Deccan Development Society in Andra Pradesh, or Sewa Mandir
in Rajasthan, and there is evidence that through such collective action the bargaining power of
women can be strengthened considerably. Joint ownership or leasing of land by groups of women
need not imply joint management or joint cultivation, although following successful models with
women's  self-help and savings and loans groups, it is likely that collective action (e.g. in making
joint investments in irrigation or inputs) will increase women's bargaining power in dealing with
government officials or in factor markets.
ACCESS  TO AND ENCROACHMENT  ON COMMONS
One way in which the rural poor and other socially excluded groups compensate for their
lack of access to and control over privately owned arable land is through access to common and
public land. While common-pool resources (CPRs) are not a major focus of the present study, it
is important to be aware of their changing significance and the consequences for the rural poor,
for several reasons: (i) commons are particularly important in the livelihoods of the rural poor
and other socially excluded groups, including women and tribal populations; (ii) CPRs
complement private land and other asset holdings; (iii) threats to the extent and quality of CPRs
harm the poor and socially excluded relatively more than they do better-off and more powerful
groups; (iv) of these threats, various forms of institutional change in recent decades have
undermined local capacity to manage CPRs through customary arrangements without replacing
them with effective alternative arrangements (state, private, or civil society). In such an
environment of institutional uncertainty, non-poor groups with a stronger ability to influence
rural institutions in their own favor have managed to encroach on commons with impunity, while
the landless, who may be legally entitled to acquire occupancy rights over a plot of cultivable
'wasteland',  may be unable to realize their legal claim in practice. Efforts to improve land
administration could make matters worse rather than better for socially excluded groups if
lessons from this experience are not learned and acted upon.
In rural India, some of the most important village commons include community forests,
pasture or 'wasteland',  river banks, river beds, ponds and tanks. Forest department land may also
form defacto  commons, whether or not local inhabitants have legal rights to its products. In total,
commons may account for around 20 percent of India's total land area. Commons provide a wide
range of physical products (e.g. food, fuel, fodder), income and employment benefits (e.g.
supplementary crops or livestock, drought period sustenance, off-season activities), and broader
social and ecological benefits (e.g. groundwater recharge, drainage, renewable resources,
27maintenance of a favorable microclimate). It has been well-documented at least for India's  dry
regions that CPRs are of particular importance for the rural poor. Based on a survey of 82
villages in 21 districts of seven states26,  Jodha (1986, 1995) showed that 70-80 per cent of total
fuel and grazing/ fodder requirements were met from CPRs for poor households, compared with
no more than 30 per cent for non-poor households with better access to private land holdings.
While 130-200 days of employment per year were met from CPRs for poor households, the
corresponding figure for non-poor households was around 30-60 days. In total, an estimated 14-
23 per cent of household income was met from CPRs for poor households, compared with only
1-3 per cent for the non-poor.
Although the household was taken as the unit of analysis in Jodha's  survey, other studies
have shown that women (in non-poor as well as poor households) depend relatively more on
commons than do men, owing to socially assigned roles for meeting household fuel and food
requirements and for raising at least some livestock (Agarwal 1989). The degree of dependence
on commons tends to be inversely related to the extent of private land holdings. Nonetheless,
access to CPRs complements private land and other asset holdings such as livestock, and allows
asset-poor households to diversify livelihoods and reduce risk, as Chopra et al. (1990)
demonstrate for the lower Shivaliks of Haryana and Punjab.
Numerous studies have documented the dramatic rates of depletion and degradation of
commons in rural India over recent decades (Jodha 1990; Chopra, Kadekodi and Murty 1990;
Arnold and Stewart 1990). In Jodha's  seven-state survey, it was found that the area of village
commons declined on average by around 31-55 per cent over the period 1950-52 to  1982-84. The
share of total village area accounted for by CPRs fell from an average of 18-41 per cent in 1950-
52 to 10-24 per cent in 1982-84 (Jodha 1986). Given their relative and absolute dependence on
CPRs, this harms the poor and other socially excluded groups more than it does the non-poor.
Longitudinal assessments of the degradation (as opposed to depletion) of commons in India are
harder to come by, owing to the absence of adequate baseline data, but are suggested by
indicators of declining biodiversity, such as the number of products derived from commons, the
number of tree and shrub species, and the relative shift from cattle to sheep and goats.
Various institutional factors underlie this decline in the extent and quality of CPRs over
recent decades, and the relative shift in the distribution of benefits from commons (or former
commons) from the rural poor to non-poor groups. Some highlight the manner in which land
reform legislation has been implemented, the transfer of 'wastelands'  and other common lands to
the jurisdiction of panchayati raj institutions (Bromley and Chapagain  1984, Shanmugaratnam
1996, Blair  1996). Others have documented the weakening of customary CPR management
practices at village level over recent decades, including levies on CPR use, penalties for
transgressions of agreed rules, seasonal restrictions on harvesting, requirements on community
members to contribute labor for the upkeep of commons, provision of watchmen, etc. (Wade
1988, Chopra et al. 1990, Blaikie et al. 1992). With isolated exceptions (Saint 1993, Singh 1995),
attempts to introduce formal management regimes through state- or NGO-initiated watershed
development or community forestry schemes (sometimes in partnership with panchayati raj
institutions) have generally been rather ineffective to date in providing an adequate institutional
basis for endogenous forms of collective action in natural resource management. Common
26 Andhra Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Kamataka,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Maharashtra,  Rajasthan,  Tamil Nadu.
28failings are inability to foster meaningful forms of local participation 27, and the tendency for
village management committees or panchayati raj institutions to be 'captured'  by factional
politics (Blair 1996, Ahluwalia 1997).
The depletion of village commons has been brought about by various processes operating
in parallel. Owing to the failure of land ceiling laws to bring about any significant redistribution
of privately owned ceiling-surplus land in practice, many states have instead sought to
redistribute some public land ('wastelands')  to landless households. Such dejure  privatization of
commons has not always led to defacto  control over land by the landless. In Orissa, for example,
the very act of pressing a claim to such land is regarded as illegal in the first instance, so that the
rights are practically impossible to 'regularize'  (Mearns and Sinha 1998). Although significant
benefits have accrued to the recipients where land has been redistributed, in spite of the small
size of land parcels allocated, much of the land redistributed is of low quality and generates low
and uncertain crop yields. Many beneficiaries do not have access to the complementary resources
(labor, capital, draft animals) required to make more productive use of such land. Moreover, state
land redistribution has often disproportionately benefited non-poor rather than poor households.
In Jodha' s survey, for example, the disparity in land holdings between poor and non-poor
widened as a result of the privatization of village commons in Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan (Jodha 1986).
Alongside such dejure  privatization there has also been a parallel process of de facto
privatization or encroachment on commons in many areas, involving the permanent or seasonal
annexation of formerly common land for private crop production. Often it is the relatively higher
value patches of land (e.g. moist depressions in drylands) that are encroached first, which leads to
a reduction in the benefits to other users out of proportion to the share of common land lost.
Those who encroach on commons tend to be non-poor farmers with more family labor and access
to complementary inputs to enable them to farm the land effectively, and who are able to
persuade or bribe the local patwari to manipulate the record of rights in land in their favor
(Ahluwalia 1997). The lack of clarity regarding local land records, and the high cost and long
duration of litigation, leaves other land users and panchayati raj institutions with few options in
challenging instances of encroachment 28. As and when efforts are made to update land records in
revisional surveys and to improve land administration systems (e.g. through title registration
where appropriate), it is essential to consider ways of handling common land so as to be better
able to prove instances of encroachment. If attention is not specifically paid to the inclusion of
commons in a unified land administration system, efforts to improve land conveyancing systems
may actually facilitate rather than hinder further encroachment on commons by the non-poor at
the expense of socially excluded groups.
27 Financial  subsidies  or matching  grants  are commonly  used  to induce  people  to contribute  their labor for
various  purposes,  which  does little  to ensure  the sustainability  of interventions  once  the subsidies  are
withdrawn  (Kerr  et al.  1996,  Kolavalli  1998).
28 Judicial  interference  has been suggested  to be even  more important  in inhibiting  successful  challenges  to
instances  of encroachment.  Courts  have  become  accustomed  to granting  'interim  stay orders'
preventing  the eviction  of a private  party, without  the opportunity  for local voices  to be heard.
Whether  or not they are poor, private  parties  (e.g. individual  farmers)  are generally  perceived  by
higher-level  courts  to be the 'underdog' in cases concerning  government  land.  A whole category  of
lawyers  specializes  in stay  orders  and constitutes  an important  stakeholder  group  in its own right
(T.V.Somanathan,  pers. comm.).
29The companion study of social exclusion and land administration in Orissa considers
further aspects relating to encroachment on commons, particularly in relation to the land rights of
tribal communities (Mearns and Sinha 1998). For example, Land alienation through indebtedness
and the mortgaging of land has long been of concern in scheduled tribal areas, and persists in
spite of legislation designed to prevent it. Given the weak bargaining power of tribal
communities, the most promising policy options to mitigate some of the practical consequences
of these forms of social exclusion concern public awareness-raising and access to information.
Some NGOs in Orissa have been effective in pursuing public interest litigation in order to defend
the land rights of tribal communities against various forms of encroachment by others.
RECORDS OF RIGHTS  IN LAND
The question of records of rights in land has been relatively neglected in contemporary
literature on land reforms and agrarian relations in India29. Remarks are often made in passing
that records of rights in land are inaccurate, out of date, and wilfully manipulated by large
landlords with the connivance of rent-seekingpatwaris,  but it is rarely regarded as a subject of
policy concern in its own right. Successive Five-Year Plans have underlined the need for the
updating of land records as mandated by legislation, but implementation has been woefully
inadequate, not least because land administration is itself a non-plan activity and therefore
receives little investment. Primary records of rights in land are maintained by patwaris at village
level, and are usually recorded in local languages and dialects using various and non-standard
measures. The physical documents, including village maps, deteriorate over time through
continuous handling, and become illegible owing to marginal notations following mutations, to
the extent that these are recorded at all. Legislative requirements for regular land settlements and
updating of land records are rarely met.
It is widely acknowledged that the costs involved in carrying out land transactions in
India are enormous. Under the Transfer of Property Act 1882 a seller of land is obliged to
produce documents of title but these are private documents, and are not guarantees of title
certified by the state. The Indian Registration Act 1908 provides for the registration of deeds in
the case of transfers of immovable property. However, such registration is voluntary rather than
compulsory and the validity or otherwise of the documents to be registered is not the concern of
the registering officer (Wadhwa 1989). As a result, any person wishing to purchase land is more
than likely to incur substantial costs in obtaining notaried copies of documents, in land valuation
and conveyancing fees (e.g. stamp duty), in associated transport costs, in bribes to patwaris and
others, and in legal fees, either to investigate title in the property in advance of purchase or in
litigation costs thereafter, since documentary evidence of title is so often defective or forged. It is
by no means uncommon for a buyer to find that 'their'  land has already been purchased by
someone else, particularly in urban areas where information asymmetries between buyers and
sellers are high. Court cases over land disputes frequently drag on for decades, and seriously
over-burden the judicial system. Probably the bulk of all pending court cases concern land
disputes, both in civil courts and in assault or public order cases30.
29 This  is not true of literature  based  on historical  research,  however;  see Smith  (1996) in particular.
30 A similar  situation  is reported  for Sri Lanka  where,  in addition,  it is claimed  that three quarters  of all
murder  cases - in a country  which  suffers  one of the highest  murder  rates in the world  - result from
land disputes  (Lynn  Holstein,  BTO,  November  6, 1997).
30Land-related  transaction  costs are onerous  for all, but are often prohibitive  for the poor.
They  are a serious obstacle  to better access  to land for the rural  poor and socially excluded.  The
companion  study in Orissa  includes  an empirical  assessment  of the formal and informal
transaction  costs involved  in the land  market  (Mearns  and Sinha 1998).  While formal  transaction
costs (e.g. registration  fees and stamp  duties)  amount  to around 17 percent of the value of the
land  transacted,  it is estimated  that informal  transaction  costs (e.g. making  repeated  visits to
tehsildar's and registrar's offices,  side-payments  to expedite  issuance  of relevant  documents,  etc)
amount  to at least as much again,  without  taking into account  the time and other  opportunity  costs
involved.  The process  of effecting  a mutation  in land  records  frequently  takes a decade or longer.
The case for improving  the system  of land administration  and records  management  so as
to reduce land  transaction  costs appears  strong.  It is strengthened  yet further  by the trends
discussed  in this paper: demographic  pressure;  rising activity  in land  markets  owing  to social and
economic  mobility;  latent  pressure  for further  growth  in market activity;  and increasing  demand
from landless,  marginal  and small  operators  to lease-in  land.  The potential  advantages  to both
buyers and sellers  of land include simpler,  cheaper  and more secure  conveyancing  procedures;
better access  to affordable,  institutional  credit  (Brandao  and Feder 1996);  and less litigation.  State
governments  also stand to gain from reduced  litigation  and from  more accurate  records of rights
in land as a basis for planning,  for the implementation  of land reforms  legislation  where
appropriate,  and to help in preventing  encroachment  on public land.
Several  types of improvement  in land  records  management  and land administration  are
possible,  including  the computerization  of land records  and land  registration  (and the integration
of the two), and institutional  reforms in land settlement  and adjudication.  Some of these  are
considered  in greater detail in the Orissa study  (Mearns  and Sinha 1998).  A One-Man  Committee
on Records  of Rights in Land under  the Indian  Planning  Commission  has proposed  that a pilot
land title registration  program  be established  in one or two districts  of selected  states, beginning
with areas in which revisional  surveys  have  recently  been  conducted  and in which records  of
rights in land are therefore  more up-to-date  (Wadhwa  1989).  This proposal  has met with
widespread  written support  from leading  judges, Chief  Justices,  academic  and practicing  lawyers,
former  ministers  of finance, revenue,  and urban development,  planning  commissioners,  and
managing  directors  of housing  and urban  development  corporations 3'. The major components  of
such a pilot program  would include  the amendment  of legislation,  provision  for a responsible
public agency,  and appropriate  institutional  strengthening.  Other  types of legal reform may  need
to be considered  as preconditions,  particularly  where legislative  restrictions  on land  transactions
are unusually  cumbersome.  Under  this proposal,  the current, 'presumptive'  titles (based on
revenue  records) would be registered  as conclusive  titles during revisional  surveys.  It is
recommended  that the process  start  with undisputed  titles, and that land  settlement  be conducted
systematically  from village  to village  within  a given  district. Given  the expected  volume  of
disputes,  one possibility  may be to establish  special  courts for land adjudication,  to relieve  some
of the existing  burden on civil courts.
Little practical progress  has been achieved  in implementing  this proposal  to date,
however.  The Chief  Minister  of Bihar is reported  to have  attempted  to introduce  title registration
but failed owing  to opposition  from rural landlords  who feared loss  of land to tenants.  A former
31 File  of correspondence  held  by Professor  D C Wadhwa.
31Revenue Minister of Maharashtra was also supportive but a change of government thwarted any
practical action. The director of the National Housing Bank proposed to the Chief Minister in
1990 that pilot activities be implemented in urban areas of Madhya Pradesh, on the grounds that
title registration would reduce credit constraints to housing development. Madhya Pradesh was
felt to be an appropriate choice of state, as it was sufficiently large for such a pilot yet
urbanization was 'manageable',  and some moves had already been made to computerize land
records in the state. Overall, the most promising states for pilot activities in different parts of the
country appear to be: Maharashtra or Gujarat (West); Kamataka, Tamil Nadu or Kerala (South);
Haryana (North); and Madhya Pradesh (Central) 32.
The range of possible stakeholders in records of rights in land is large, however, and is
not restricted to those with interests in rural land affairs. Conclusive title is likely to be
particularly attractive to urban as well as rural stakeholders, including potential purchasers of
residential property, housing and urban development corporations, and financial institutions that
extend credit for housing development (Bijlani and Rao 1993). Table 4 provides a very rough
first attempt to indicate some of the relevant stakeholders. It groups stakeholders according to the
potential importance of the proposed reforms to respective stakeholder groups, and the relative
degree of influence the stakeholders may be expected to have over the outcome (whether to
support or oppose reforms). Provided certain safeguards are built into the process of land
settlement and title registration to protect the urban poor and socially excluded groups including
those legally regarded as 'squatters',  improvements in land administration could also assist in the
more effective implementation of policies concerning resettlement and rehabilitation in urban
(and rural) development.
Other stakeholders are likely to oppose reforms in the existing system of land
conveyancing and land administration, unless specific steps are taken to make reforms more
attractive to them. Such stakeholders include the village record keepers (paiwaris or revenue
inspectors), large land owners who manage illegally to evade land ceilings, those in the legal
profession who stand to profit from litigation, and urban development corporations with vested
interests in the circulation of so-called 'black money' to facilitate developments that evade legal
regulations (e.g. the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act). The legal profession, for example,
could be expected to benefit from the additional work generated by land adjudication under
revisional surveys for some considerable time to come. It is difficult to make generalizations
about the likely balance between those supporting reforms and those opposing them, but it is
essential that this type of stakeholder and institutional analysis be conducted to guide the
preparation of concrete proposals in selected states. To the extent that pro-reform stakeholders in
urban areas have greater political voice than those in rural areas, urban-rural coalitions are likely
to prove useful in galvanizing support for reforms in land administration.
General consensus has emerged from preliminary work on urban land markets in India
that the legal and regulatory framework - chiefly the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the Urban
Land Ceilings and Regulation Act 1976 - is over-complex, impedes urban development, and
severely constrains access to serviced land by the urban poor (Bijlani and Rao 1993, Muttagi
1996). Evasion is widespread, and it is common practice to delay land acquisitions through
32 Professor  D C Wadhwa,  personal  communication.  Criteria  for this selection  included:  expectation  of
support  from state government,  and current  status  of records  of rights in land (e.g . recent  revisional
surveys  conducted).
32protracted litigation. Although there is a trend away from a regulatory approach towards a more
market-orientated approach (e.g. public/private partnerships involving private developers and
community-based organizations; use of fiscal instruments such as vacant property tax and/or
luxury tax), progress to date has not generally been promising. For example, an experiment with
a US-influenced model of Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) in Mumbai, which allows
for negotiated land purchase by providing incentives to existing owners rather than compulsory
acquisition, has done little to accelerate land acquisition for low-income housing or infrastructure
development. Stakeholder analysis reveals opposition by those with formal land rights under the
existing legal framework, and by municipal bureaucrats, to what they perceive to be the
illegitimate acquisition of land rights by private sector developers on the one hand, and by
Table 4  Potential  stakeholders  in reform  of land  registration
Relative  degree of influence
High  Low
*  Large landowners (owner-  *  Prospective buyers and
operator and absentee)  sellers of rural land
High  *  Revenue Inspectors  *  Lawyers?
*  Judiciary?
*  Potential buyers and sellers
of urban property
*  Housing development
corporations (public and
private)
0  Finance institutions
providing credit  for  housing
development
*  Rural credit institutions  *  Private sector surveyors
*  NGOs & CBOs promoting
Low  interests of rural poor
*  Agencies involved in R&R
(including donors)
Note: Stakeholders shown in italics expected to support proposed
reforms; stakeholders underlined expected to oppose reforms
'squatters'  in informal settlements on the other (Muttagi 1996). In this overall debate, it
recognized that poor land records are one of several obstacles to progress. There are strong
33incentives for both sellers and purchasers of land to avoid registration of transfer documents,
since this is likely to incur substantial one-off taxes including: stamp duties on sale or lease,
capital gains tax, land value increments, and transfer duties. Instead, most sellers/purchasers
adopt cheap and simple practices for transferring de facto 'title',  including the General Power of
Attorney, Agreement to Sell, and Wills, none of which is legally required to be registered, and all
of which is to a greater or lesser extent uncertain (Bijlani and Rao 1993).
Several lessons emerge from Bank-supported and other international experience with
land titling and registration schemes over the last 10-20 years (Hanstad 1996, Holstein 1997).
Experience from projects implemented during the 1980s showed that performance was poor
where multiple objectives were sought within a multi-agency institutional framework, and where
government commitment was lacking (Wachter and English 1992). Projects initiated during the
1990s tend to have a clearer focus on the principal objective of issuing registered titles to land
holders. A single agency approach is preferable where possible, in which the agency concerned is
responsible for base mapping for cadastral purposes, and takes the lead in adjudication, cadastral
surveying and registration functions. Land settlement and adjudication needs to be conducted in
as transparent a manner as possible, preferably in the field with maximum community
involvement (including local representation on settlement teams) 33. It is essential that
transparency and accountability also be promoted by means of a well-funded, long-term public
information and disclosure campaign, which is particularly important to reach socially excluded
groups (e.g. currently unregistered tenants). Staff incentives and training often prove to be
critical, particularly where public salaries are low and opportunities for rent-seeking are
widespread. Consideration needs to be given to what aspects of land administration may be more
efficiently contracted out to the private sector, and mechanisms to ensure quality and
professionalism.
International experience also shows systematic (e.g. village by village) rather than
sporadic (on-demand) registration to be preferable, since it is likely to achieve faster and more
complete coverage, economies of scale, and greater transparency. It is not without attendant risks
and disadvantages, however: systematic registration requires government to be proactive, the cost
burden falls to government, and the timing of adjudication may not suit land holders (e.g. with
respect to inheritance). Regarding tenure security, major concerns should include: the substance
of tenurial rights to be registered (e.g. transferability, rights to lease, mortgage etc.) rather than
their name (freehold vs. leasehold); recognition of de facto or prescriptive rights (whether or not
they are formally documented); and the identities of rightholders (e.g. joint titles or independent
titles for women as well as men). Finally, caution should be exercised in the introduction of
computerized information technology (IT). Current failures may lie in unclear objectives and
methods, faulty manual systems, and a lack of skilled staff, in which case the introduction of IT
alone will not solve existing problems. In such situations it is usually better to introduce
incremental improvements, and to support the computerization of land registration by starting
with new parcels and subsequent transactions, with manual and computerized systems operating
in parallel for some time.
The Orissa  study  highlights  some of the ways in  which  conventional  land survey  and settlement
operations  discriminate  systematically  against  the rural poor and other  socially  excluded  groups
(Mearns  and Sinha 1998).
34Several circumstances discussed in this paper suggest that improving land registration in
India may be desirable: both rural and urban development is believed to be constrained by
insecurity or uncertainty of land title; in many places there is a developing land market, a high
incidence of land disputes, and growing demand for credit; and the stated desire exists to
implement redistributive land reforms. But land registration is by no means a panacea (Simpson
1976). It is important to weigh carefully the expected costs and benefits of land registration, and
to take steps to ensure that socially excluded groups do not become worse off as a result. For
example, formal land registration systems have had regressive gender consequences in numerous
cases (e.g. Kenya, Zimbabwe) by reinforcing women's  lack of effective, independent land rights.
In India, in spite of the fact that Hindu women, at least, have legal rights to inherit land, social
customs tend to prevail and these rights are normally assigned to male relatives. In the
introduction of a land registration system, it is important to provide policy support for the
possibility of women's  independent land rights, to correct gender biases against women inheriting
parental land, and against women as tenant farmers. The possibility of alternative institutional
arrangements could also be considered to enhance women's  effective control over land, such as
group land ownership/ land-pooling, together with collective investment in tubewells (Agarwal
1998). Similarly, if careful attention is not paid in advance to the status of public and panchayat-
owned common lands, land registration may simply legitimize or accelerate existing, de facto
encroachment on commons by more powerful groups at the expense of those without effective
voice.
This is probably the most serious potential danger of land registration: it may provide
opportunities for 'land grabbing' by those who are more powerful, better informed, and who have
better access to officials and greater financial means (Feder and Nishio 1997). The potential for
land grabbing is probably greater when registration is sporadic rather than systematic.
Nonetheless, where conditions suggest that the benefits of registration for poorer and socially
excluded groups may outweigh the costs, certain safeguards may be built in to guard against such
potential dangers. The importance of public information campaigns is paramount, in order to
inform all those with interests in land of their legal rights. Other possible measures include: strict
contract and notice requirements for documents pertaining to land transfer (though this may do
little to prevent delays by courts), legal aid for low-income or illiterate persons, and possible
moratoria on sales for several years after title is granted (Hanstad 1996)34.
34  Moratoria  on post-titling.sales  may do little to prevent  land-grabbing,  as the westem  US experience  of
homesteading  showed.
355  SUMMARY AND POLICY OPTIONS
A number of guidelines  for policy  emerge  from this review  paper,  and are briefly summarised
below.  More specific  suggestions  for policy  are outlined  in the companion  paper  with particular
reference  to Orissa  (Mearns  and Sinha 1998).
*  Selective  deregulation  of land-lease  (rental)  markets: Under  the Ninth Plan, the
Government  of India is considering  the possibility  of a middle ground  between  past,
regulatory  approaches  towards  tenancy  reforms/  lease contracts,  and total liberalization.
Regulatory  approaches  came about  within  a particular  post-Independence  context in which
lease contracts  were perceived  to be a means  for the rich to exploit the poor. This situation
was probably  not typical  even  when 'land to the tiller' reforms  were introduced,  and evidence
suggests  that it is now rare in India.  On the contrary,  rental markets  are an important  means
by which  the poor gain access  to land.  However,  evidence  suggests  that the deregulation  of
rental markets  will benefit the poor only where there is a credible  threat of ceilings
enforcement,  and where  there is a possibility  of clearly  defined  and enforceable  contracts.
Overall,  still too little is known  about  land  rental markets  in particular  states, and comparative
empirical  studies across several  states are needed  to identify  the likely consequences  of
selective  deregulation  under varying  conditions.
=  Reduction  of transaction  costs in land markets:  Transaction  costs in land sale-purchase
markets include both the official  costs (e.g. registration  fees, stamp  duties  and surcharges)
and informal  costs (e.g. bribes to expedite  transactions,  fees to informal  land valuers,  etc),
which  together may amount  to a third of the total value of the land transacted.  These  high
costs are onerous  for all, but are prohibitive  for the rural poor, and explain in large  measure
why so many land holders  do not hold effective  title to their land. The risk of losing land
through encroachment  by others, and through  lack of transparency  in settlement  and
consolidation  operations,  is considerably  higher  where land holders lack clear title to their
land.  This is most likely to be true for the rural poor and other socially  excluded groups.
Measures  to improve  the efficiency  of land records  management  and land registration
generally  focus on computerization.  This is not a panacea,  particularly  if incentive  structures
within land management  agencies  are not simultaneously  addressed.  However,  provided  there
is close coordination  between  the computerization  of registration  and of land records, it
offers high potential  for reducing  transaction  costs in obtaining  title to land,  and thereby
helps facilitate  access  to institutional  credit. Of utmost  importance  is the 'backwards
integration' of land  registration  into land records  management,  so as to permit more or less
simultaneous  mutation  of the official  record.
*  Critical  reassessment  of land administration  agencies: Reforms in land administration  will
be ineffective  if the incentive  structures  within  which the relevant  government  officers  work
are not simultaneously  addressed.  Rent-seeking  is widespread,  and is usually  a reflection  of
the fact that landholders  are willing  to pay a price to receive  the kind of service  they have a
right  to expect. Where  this creates  difficulties  is that it tends to lead  to the systematic
exclusion  of the rural poor from gaining  more  secure  access  to land, since  the rural poor are
least likely to be able to bear  the high transaction  costs involved  in pressing  for legal
protection  of their existing  rights, or in acquiring  new rights.  Rent-seeking  serves  to ration
access  to government  services.  Day-to-day  incentives  and promotion  opportunities  for
revenue  inspectors  and other  low-level  government  officers  are not performance-related.
While  reforms in land administration  that aim to promote  transparency  and public access  to
36information  are essential,  coupled  with the countervailing  influence  of strong  civil society
institutions,  it is equally  important  that the land administration  officers  are regarded  as allies
rather  than obstacles  to reform,  and ways  devised  to see that they also benefit.
Promotion of women's independent  land rights: the clearest  way to begin  challenging
embedded  social  norms and customs  that prevent  women  from exercising  their legal rights to
hold land is through policy  measures  that aim explicitly  to increase  the bargaining  power of
women  within  the household  and within  wider society.  Women's access  to land  may come
about  through inheritance  of parental  property,  government  allotment  of ceiling-surplus  land,
and clear contractual  access  through tenancy  and access  to commons.  In some states,  gender
biases in tenancy laws need  to be removed,  as do certain  biases in the Hindu Succession  Act
of 1956.  Legislative  measures  alone will be insufficient,  however,  and will do little to
challenge  discriminatory  norms and customs.  Even limited  steps such as  joint land  title over
ceiling-surplus  land  and house-sites,  for example,  which are already  accepted  at the policy
level,  have yet to be implemented  on any substantial  scale.  A complementary  approach
towards  realizing  women's land  rights directly  would  be to grant  land to groups  of women,
with access  to credit for complementary  investments  and inputs such as tubewell  irrigation.
Such  collective  approaches,  often  with NGOs  playing  a catalytic  role, have demonstrated
advantages  in strengthening  women's bargaining  power,  which might then allow  them more
scope  to challenge  customary  restrictions  on their independent  property  rights.
Transparency  andpublic access to information: A principal  reason for high observed  rates
of rent-seeking  by government  officers  in land  administration,  and for patterns  of
discrimination  against  the rural poor and other  groups  with weak bargaining  power,  is the
very complexity  of the legislative  framework  governing  land  reform and land  administration
in many states.  In spite of well-meaning  provisions  ostensibly  designed  to protect  the poor,
this complexity  allows considerable  scope  to those - usually  the non-poor  - who are best able
to exploit legal loopholes  to their own  advantage.  Our Orissa  study reveals  some of the ways
in which access  to land  by the rural poor is inhibited  by the practical  functioning  of land
survey  and settlement  operations,  land  consolidation  programs,  the failures in implementation
of legislation  to prevent  encroachment  on revenue  land,  and in land records management
more  generally.  While these findings  cannot  be assumed  to apply  to all states,  they do
suggest  hypotheses  that may be tested through  further  state-level  studies.  Overall,  it is
suggested  that the legislative  framework  governing  land  administration  in many  states
warrants  considerable  simplification  (e.g. bringing  together of numerous  laws into  a unified
structure),  and that investments  be made in the wide public  dissemination  (e.g. local-language
manuals,  made  available  through gram  panchayat  meetings)  of information  regarding
people's land  rights, and how to go about  pressing  legal claims to land.
Strong civil society institutions:  Strong  civil society  institutions  are the other side of the coin
to transparency  and public access  to information.  Where  there has been  most success  in
tenancy reforms  (e.g. West  Bengal)  and land  consolidation  (e.g. Uttar  Pradesh),  common
ingredients  have included  broad-based  participation  through strong representative  bodies
(e.g. panchayats)  or community-based  organizations.  NGOs  have achieved  wide and justified
acclaim for their efforts in defending  tribal land  rights, women's land  rights, and pursuing
public interest litigation  to prevent  illegal  encroachment  by non-poor  groups  on land intended
for redistribution  to the landless.  In all these cases, awareness-raising,  monitoring,  and
pressure from strong civil society  institutions  ensures  that there are checks  and balances  on
inappropriate  uses of state  power,  and that safeguards  for the poor are upheld  in law
37enforcement. Perhaps most important is to support the emerging competencies of the
contitutionally mandated panchayati raj institutions, which hold most promise over the
medium- to longer-term of performing this 'watchdog'  role in relations between state, the
private sector, and civil society.
38BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agarwal,  Bina. 1989.  Rural  women,  poverty  and natural  resources:  sustenance,  sustainability  and
struggle  for change.  Economic  and Political Weekly  Oct 28: WS46-WS65
Agarwal,  Bina. 1994a.  A Field of One's Own:  gender and land rights in South Asia. Cambridge:
Cambridge  University  Press
Agarwal,  Bina. 1994b.  Gender and command  over property:  a critical gap in economic  analysis
and policy in South  Asia. World  Development  22(10): 1455-1478
Agarwal,  Bina. 1995.  Gender and legal rights in agricultural  land  in India.  Economic  and
Political Weekly  Mar 25: A39-A56
Agarwal,  Bina. 1998.  Disinherited  peasants,  disadvantaged  workers:  a gender  perspective  on land
and livelihood.  Economic  and Political Weekly  Mar 28: A2-A14
Ahluwalia,  Meenakshi.  1997.  Representing  Communities:  the case of a community-based
watershed  development  project  in Rajasthan.  IDS Bulletin  28(4): 23-34
Appu, P S. 1996.  Land  Reforms in India: a survey  ofpolicy legislation  and implementation.  New
Delhi: Vikas
Arnold,  J E M, and W C Stewart.  1990.  Common  property resource  management  in India.
Oxford:  Oxford  Forestry  Institute
Attwood,  D W. 1979.  Why some of the poor get richer: economic  change and mobility  in rural
western India.  Current  Anthropology  20(3):  495-515
Aziz, Abdul, and Sudhir  Krishna  (eds.). 1997.  Land  Reforms in India, Vol.  4. Karnataka:
promises kept and missed.  New Delhi:  Sage
Ballabh,  Vishwa,  and T S Walker. 1992.  Land fragmentation  and consolidation  in dry semi-arid
tropics  of India.  Artha Vijnana  34(4):  363-387
Baden-Powell,  B H. 1892. The  Land  Systems of British  India. Oxford: Clarendon  Press
Banerjee,  Abhijit V, and Maitreesh  Ghatak. 1996.  Empowerment  and efficiency:  the economics
of tenancy reform.  Mimeo,  MIT and Harvard  University
Behuria,  N C. 1997.  Land  Reforms  Legislation  in India: a comparative  study. New Delhi:  Vikas
Bell, Clive. 1990.  Reforming  property  rights in land and tenancy. World  Bank  Research  Observer
5(2): 143-66
Berry, R Albert,  and William  R Cline. 1979.  Agrarian  Structure  and Productivity  in Developing
Countries.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins  University  Press
39Besley,  Timothy,  and Robin Burgess.  1998.  Land reform,  poverty  reduction  and growth:
evidence  from India. Mimeo,  London School  of Economics
Bhalla, Surjit S, and Prannoy  Roy. 1988.  Mis-specification  in farm  productivity  analysis:  the role
of land  quality. Oxford  Economic  Papers  40: 55-73
Bhaumik,  Sankar  Kumar. 1993.  Tenancy  Relations  andAgrarian  Development:  a study of West
Bengal.  New Delhi: Sage
Bijlani,  H U, and P S N Rao. 1993.  Improving  Delivery  of Serviced  Urban  Land in India: Action
Programme.  Report  to USAID,  National  Housing  Bank, and Ministry of Urban  Development.
HUDMA  Consultants,  New Delhi
Binswanger,  Hans  P, and Klaus  Deininger.  1997.  Explaining  agricultural  and agrarian  policies in
developing  countries.  Journal ofEconomic Literature  35: 1958-2005
Binswanger,  Hans,  Klaus Deininger,  and Gershon  Feder. 1995.  'Power, distortions,  revolt, and
reform in agricultural  land relations',  chapter 42 in Jere Behrman  and T N Srinivasan  (eds),
Handbook  of Development  Economics,  Vol. III. Amsterdam:  Elsevier
Binswanger,  Hans, and Mark  R Rosenzweig.  1986.  Behavioural  and material  determinants  of
production  relations  in agruiculture.  Journal ofDevelopment  Studies  : 503-39
Blaikie,  Piers,  John Harriss,  and Adam Pain. 1992.  'The management  and use of common-
property  resources in Tamil  Nadu,  India', chapter 11 in Daniel  W Bromley  (ed), Making the
Commons  Work:  theory,  practice and  policy. San  Francisco:  ICS Press
Blair, Harry W. 1996.  Democracy,  equity  and common  property  resource  management  in the
Indian  subcontinent.  Development  and Change  27(3):  475-499
Brandao,  Antonio Salazar  P, and Gershon  Feder. 1996.  'Regulatory  policies and reform: the case
of land markets', chapter 10 in Claudio  Frischtak  (ed), Regulatory  Policies and Reform:  a
Comparative  Perspective
Bromley,  Daniel W, and Devendra  P Chapagain.  1984.  The village  against  the center:  resource
depletion  in South  Asia.  American  Journal ofAgricultural  Economics  66(5): 868-73
Carter, Michael  R, and Dina Mesbah. 1993.  'State-mandated  and market-mediated  land reform in
Latin America', in Lipton,  Michael,  and Jacques  van der Gaag (eds),  Including  the Poor.
Washington,  DC: World  Bank
Chadha,  G K. 1994.  On the concept  and reality of the landless  in rural India.  Indian  Journal of
Agricultural  Economics  49(3): 352-359
Chopra, Kanchan,  Gopal K Kadekodi,  and M  N Murty. 1990.  Participatory  Development:  People
and Common  Property  Resources.  New Delhi:  Sage
Deininger,  Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1996.  Economic  growth  and inequality:  reexamining  the links.
World  Bank Economic  Review 10: 565-91
40Desai, Bhupat M. 1997. Determinants of total factor productivity in Indian agriculture. Economic
and Political  Weekly Dec. 27: A165-A171
Dreze, Jean, and Haris Gazdar. 1996. 'Uttar Pradesh: the burden of inertia',  chapter 2 in Jean
Dreze and Amartya Sen, Indian Development. selected regionalperspectives.  Delhi: Oxford
University Press
Fan, Shenggen, Peter Hazell and Sukhadeo Thorat. 1998. Government Spending, Growth and
Poverty: an analysis of interlinkages in rural India. Mimeo, IFPRI
Farmer, B H. 1960. On not controlling subdivision in paddy lands. Transactions of the Institute of
British Geographers 28: 225-235
Faruqee, Rashid, and Kevin Carey. 1997. Research on land markets in South Asia: what have we
learned? Policy Research Working Paper 1754. Washington, DC: World Bank
Feder, Gerson. 1985. The relation between farm size and farm productivity: the role of family
labor, supervision, and credit constraints. Journal of Development Economics 18(2-3): 297-313
Feder, Gershon, and Akihiko Nishio (forthcoming). The benefits of land registration and titling:
economic and social perspectives. Land Use Policy
Government of India. 1997a. Land Reforms: Policy for the Ninth Plan. Department of Rural
Development, Government of India, New Delhi
Government of India. 1997b. Policy relating to sharecropping and leasing: a discussion paper.
Department of Rural Development, Government of India, New Delhi
Gupta, J. 1993. Land, dowry, labor: women in the changing economy of Midnapur. Social
Scientist 21(9-11): 74-90
Hanstad, Tim. 1996. Land registration in developing countries. RDI Reports on Foreign Aid and
Development No. 89. Seattle: Rural Development Institute
Harriss, John. 1993. What is happening in rural West Bengal? Agrarian reform, growth and
distribution. Economic and Political Weekly June 12: 1237-47
Herring, Ronald J. 1983. Land to the Tiller: the political economy of agrarian reform in South
Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press
Heston, Alan, and Dharma Kumar. 1983. The persistence of land fragmentation in peasant
agriculture: an analysis of South Asian cases. Explorations in Economic History 20: 199-220
Holstein, Lynn. 1996. 'Towards best practice from World Bank experience in land titling and
registration',  paper presented at International Conference on Land Tenure and Administration,
Orlando, November 12-14
41Jayaraman,  Raji, and Peter Lanjouw.  1998.  The evolution  of poverty  and inequality  in Indian
villages.  Policy  Research  Working  Paper 1870.  Washington,  DC: World  Bank
Jodha,  N S. 1986.  Common  property  resources  and rural poor in dry regions  of India. Economic
and Political Weekly  21(27): 1169-81
Jodha,  N S. 1990.  Rural common  property  resources:  contributions  and crisis. Economic  and
Political Weekly  25(26): A65-A78
Jodha,  N S. 1995.  Common  property  resources  and the dynamics  of rural poverty  in India's dry
regions. Unasylva  46(180):  23-29
Kerr, John M, N K Sanghi  and G Srimappa.  1996.  'Subsidies in watershed  development  projects
in India', in J Pretty, I Guijt, and P Shah (eds),  New Horizons:  the  Economic,  Social and
Environmental  Impacts of Participatory  Watershed  Development.  New Delhi: Sage
Kessinger,  T G. 1974. Vilyatpur,  1848-1968.  Berkeley:  California  University  Press
Kochar,  Anjini. 1992.  Credit constraints  and land  tenancy markets  in rural India.  Institute  for
Policy  Reform Working  Paper  No. 54. Washington,  DC
Kolavalli,  Shashi.  1998.  A review  of approaches  to watershed  development  in India.  Draft report
to NCAEPR,  Indian  Council  of Agricultural  Research
Land Reforms  Unit. 1990.  Land  Reforms in India: an empirical  study, 1989-90.  Report  to
Ministry of Rural  Development,  Government  of India.  Mussoorie:  Land Reforms  Unit, Lal
Bahadur  Shastri  National  Academy  of Administration
Leach, Melissa,  Robin Mearns,  and Ian Scoones.  1998  (in press).  Environmental  entitlements:
dynamics  and institutions  in community-based  natural resource  management.  World  Development
Lieten,  G K. 1996.  Land reforms  at centre stage:  the evidence  on West Bengal.  Development  and
Change  27: 111-130
Lipton,  Michael. 1985.  Land assets and rural poverty.  World  Bank Staff Working  Papers  No. 744.
Washington,  DC: World  Bank
Lipton, Michael. 1993.  Land reform  as commenced  business:  the evidence  against stopping.
World  Development  21(4): 641-657
Mani, Gyanendra,  and Vasant  P Gandhi. 1994.  Are land markets  worsening  the land  distribution
in progressive  areas?: a study  of Meerut  District  in Western  Uttar Pradesh.  Indian Journal of
Agricultural  Economics  49(3): 330-338
Maurya,  R R. 1994. Uttar  Pradesh  Land  Laws. Allahabad:  Central Law Publications
Mearns,  Robin, and Saurabh  Sinha. 1998  (forthcoming).  Social  Exclusion  and Land
Administration  in Orissa,  India.  Policy  Research Working  Paper. Washington,  DC: World  Bank
42Melmed-Sanjak, Jolyne. 1998. A review of the literature on land leasing arrangements in selected
Asian countries. Mimeo. Report to FAO, Rome
Mohapatra, K. 1994. Land, labor, and credit market interlocking: a study of Orissa agriculture.
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics 49(3): 339-45
Muttagi, P K. 1996. Problems and Prospects of Land Transfers in Mumbai. Report to World
Bank. Mimeo, Mumbai
Neale, Walter C. 1969. 'Land is to rule', in Robert E. Frykenberg (ed), Land Control and Social
Structure in Indian History. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press
Neale, Walter C. 1990. "'Revolutionary reforms" versus social structure and politics:
commentaries on Indian land reforms and Panchayati Raj',  in Walter C. Neale, Developing Rural
India: policies, politics, andprogress.  Glen Dale, MD: Riverdale
Oldenburg, Philip. 1985. Forced to be Fair: citizen participation in the land consolidation process
in Uttar Pradesh. Draft working paper, Dept of Political Science, Columbia University
Oldenburg, Philip.  1990. Land consolidation as land reform, in India. World Development  18(2):
183-195
Olson Lanjouw, Jean. 1998. Information and the operation of markets: tests based on a general
equilibrium model of land leasing in India. Mimeo, Yale University and NBER
Pandey, V K, and S K Tewari. 1996. Regional agricultural land use: a sectoral aggregate view.
Indian Journal ofAgricultural  Economics 51 (1&2): 260-269
Parthasarthy, G. 1991. Lease market, poverty alleviation and policy options. Economic and
Political Weekly March 30: A3  1  -A3  8
Ray, S K. 1996. Land system and its reforms in India. Indian Journal ofAgricultural  Economics
51 (1&2): 220-237
Reddy, V Ratna. 1993. New technology in agriculture and changing size-productivity
relationships: a study of Andhra Pradesh. Indian Journal ofAgricultural  Economics 48(4): 633-
48
Rosenzweig, Mark R, and Kenneth L Wolpin. 1985. Specific experience, household structure,
and intergenerational transfers: farm family land and labor arrangements in developing countries.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (Supplement): 961-87
Sadoulet, Elizabeth, Rinku Murgai, and Alain de Janvry. 1998. Access to land via land rental
markets. Mimeo, University of Berkeley and World Bank
Sahu, Bhairabi Prasad (ed). 1997. Land System and Rural Society in Early India. Delhi: Manohar
Saint, Kishore. 1993. Community management of common lands: improving land management in
Rasjathan. Jaipur: Intercooperation
43Sarap, Kailash. 1995. Land sale transactions in an Indian village: theories and evidence. Indian
Economic Review 3  0(2): 223-40
Sengupta, Sunil, and Haris Gazdar. 1996. 'Agrarian politics and rural development in West
Bengal',  in Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen (eds.), Indian Development: selected regional
perspectives. New Delhi: Oxford University Press
Shanmugaratnam, N. 1996. Nationalization and privatization of arid lands and dilemmas of
common property management in Western Rajasthan, India. Journal of Development Studies
33(2): 163-187
Sharma, H R. 1992. Evolution of agrarian relations in India. Journal of Indian School of Political
Economy 4(1): 80-105
Sharna,  H R. 1992. Agrarian relations in India since independence. Journal of Indian School of
Political Economy 4(2): 201-262
Sharma, H R. 1994. Distribution of landholdings in rural India, 1953-54 to 1981-82: implications
for land reforms. Economic and Political  Weekly Mar 26: A12-A25
Simpson, S Rowton. 1976. Land Law and Registration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Singh, Bant, H S Bal, and Narinder Kumar. 1991. A spatio-temporal analysis of land-lease
market in Punjab. Indian Journal ofAgricultural  Economics 46(3): 355-60
Singh, Bhanwar. 1985.  Agrarian Structure, Technological Change and Poverty. New Delhi:
Agricole Publishing Academy
Singh, Inderjit. 1990. The Great Ascent: the ruralpoor  in South Asia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press for the World Bank
Singh, Katar. 1995. The watershed management approach to sustainability of renewable
common-pool natural resources: lessons of India's  experience. Research Paper No. 14. Anand:
Institute of Rural Management
Skoufias, Emmanuel. 1995. Household resources, transaction costs, and adjustment through land
tenancy. Land Economics 71(1): 42-56
Smith, Richard Saumarez. 1996. Rule by Records: land registration and village custom in early
British Panjab. Delhi: Oxford University Press
Thangaraj, M. 1995. Trends in fragmentation of operational holdings in India: an exploratory
analysis. Indian Journal ofAgricultural  Economics 5  0(2): 176-184
Vaidyanathan, A. 1994. Agrarian relations in the context of new agricultural technology:  an
issues paper. Indian Journal ofAgricultural  Economics 49(3): 317-329
44Wachter, Daniel, and John English. 1992. The World Bank's experience with rural land titling.
Environment Department Divisional Working Paper  1992-35. Washington, DC: World Bank
Wade, Robert. 1988. Village Republics: economic conditions for  collective action in South India.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Wadhwa, D C. 1989. Guaranteeing title to land: a preliminary study. Bombay: Tripathi for
Planning Commission, Government of India
World Bank. 1993. India: Policies and Issues in Forest Sector Development. Report No. 10965-
IN. Washington, DC: World Bank
World Bank.  1997. Rural Development: From Vision to Action. Washington, DC: World Bank
Yugandhar, B N (ed.). 1996. Land Reforms in India, Vol. 3. Andhra Pradesh: People 's Pressure
and Administrative Innovations. New Delhi: Sage
Yugandhar, B N, and K Gopal Iyer (eds.). 1995. Land Reforms in India,  Vol. 1. Bihar:
Institutional Constraints. New Delhi: Sage
Yugandhar, B N, and P S Datta (eds.). 1995. Land Reforms in India, Vol. 2. Rajasthan:
Feudalism and Change. New Delhi: Sage
45Annex 1  Land  reform  legislation in India,  by state
State  Ceilings act  Lowest ceiling  Act provides for  Type of  Key legal provisions concerning  Comments on
(for irrigated land  ceiling only, or both  holding to  tenancy  progress with
producing two or  ceiling and tenancy  which  land
more crops a  reforms?  ceilings apply  consolidation
year)
Andhra Pradesh  AP Land Reforms on Agricultural  4 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Informal tenancies not recorded. Leasing  Legislation  exists, little
Holdings Act, 1973  tenanted  is permitted but regulated (minimum  progress  in
lease period 6 years). No fair rent  implementation
legislation
Assam  Assam Fixation of Ceilings on  7 ha  Ceiling only  Owned  Conforms to national guidelines  Legislation  exists but  no
Land Holdings Act, 1956  progress
Bihar  Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of  6 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  No legal provision for informal tenancies  Legislation  exists, little
Ceiling Area and Acquisition of  tenanted  to be recorded  progress  in
Surplus Land) Act, 1961  implementation
Gujarat  Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling  4 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Conforms to national guidelines  Legislation  exists, little
Act, 1960  tenanted  progress  in
.________________________  _________implementation
Haryana  Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings  7 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Definition of 'personal cultivation'  of  Consolidation  completed
Act, 1972  tenanted  landlord so broad  as to encompass all
distant relatives. No fair rent legislation.
Minimum lease period 3-7 years
Himachal Pradesh  HP Ceilings on Land Holdings Act,  4 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Conforms to national guidelines  Legislation  exists,  some
1972  tenanted  progress
Jammu and Kashmir  J&K Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976  9 ha  Ceiling and tenancy  Owned and  Conforms to national guidelines  n/a
tenanted
Karnataka  Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961  4 ha  Ceiling and tenancy  Owned and  Ambiguity persists regarding status of  Legislation  exists,  some
tenanted  'registered  occupants'  progress
Kerala  Kerala Land Reform Act, 1963  6 ha  Ceiling and tenancy  Owned and  'Landlord'-'tenant'  relation abolished in  n/a  (no  legislation  exists)
tenanted  law
Madhya Pradesh  MP Ceiling on Agricultural  7 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Leasing/ sharecropping prohibited,  Substantial  progress
Holdings Act, 1960  tenanted  leaving status of tenants very insecure
(e.g. no fair rent legislation)
Maharashtra  Maharashtra Agricultural Land  7 ha  Ceiling and tenancy  Owned  Some recording of informal tenancies in  Substantial  progress
Reforms (Ceiling on Holdings)  Vidharbha area; rent compulsorily
Act, 1961  payable in cash in Bombay area
Orissa  Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960  4 ha  Ceiling only  Owned  'Tenancy'  not recognised, therefore no  Legislation  exists  but  no
provision for recording of informal  progress
tenancies. Status of tenants very
.... ________________  _____________________________  __________________  _____________________  __  insecure.  Leasing prohibited
L6Punjab  Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972  7 ha  Ceiling only  n/a  Definition of 'personal cultivation'  of  Consolidation  completed
landlord so broad as to encompass all
distant relatives. No fair rent legislation.
Minimum lease period 3-7 years
Rajasthan  Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on  7 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Overly complex legislation. No  Legislation  exists  but little
Holdings Act, 1973  tenanted  provision for recording informal  progress
tenancies. Since tenants are entitled to a
written  lease,  oral tenancies  are ignored.
Minimum lease period 1 year or 5 years,
_ ___________________________  depending  on type
Tamil Nadu  Tamil Nadu Land Reforms  5 ha  Ceiling only  Owned and  Unlike in other states, does not provide  n/a  (no  legislation  exists)
(Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act,  tenanted  for resumption of land for personal
1961  cultivation by landlord, nor for
conferring ownership rights on tenants.
Once land leased out, however, tenant
cannot be evicted (as in West Bengal)
Uttar Pradesh  UP Imposition of Ceiling on Land  7 ha  Ceiling only  Owned  Total prohibition of leasing except for  Consolidation  largely
Holdings Act, 1960  'disabled persons'  (including unmarried,  completed
separated, divorced women and widows).
Even for these groups, no legal
protection of lease terms. Absolutely no
protection for all other tenants (e.g. fair
rent legislation). Landowners not even
required to cultivate land personally  as in
other states
West Bengal  West Bengal Land Reforms Act,  5 ha  Ceiling and tenancy  Owned  Unique feature is to bring all land (not  Legislation  exists  but no
1955 (last amended 1986)  just agricultural land) under ceiling law.  progress
Continuous tenants acquire permanent,
heritable rights in law, but these cannot
be transferred to others (e.g. mortgaged).
Tenants have option to register
tenancies. Sub-letting is prohibited, and
tenants cannot be evicted. Rents must be
paid in kind
Sources:  based  on Behuria  (1997)  and Thangaraj  (1995)
47Annex 2  Studies of land sale-purchase transactions in rural India
Study area  Data,  source  Active  land  market?  Characteristics  of sellers!  Characteristics  of buyers!  Increase  in land  Comments
reasons  for sale  reasons  for purchase  concentration?
Jangalpur  patwari  records/  No (approx  2 sales/  small/  marginal  farmers:  39%  from outside  village  Yes  (from  small/  Little irrigated  land;
village,  survey  of all  purchases  per  year);  mainly  distress  sales (esp. in  (including  those  from village but  marginal  farmers  to  fixed tenancies
Madhya  transactions  strong  preference  for  drought  years);  working  elsewhere),  for both ag  those with  increasing
Pradesh  1950-93  holding  land (high  medium/  large  farmers:  and non-ag  purposes  (e.g.  option  diversified  income
(Sarap  1995)  personal  and socio-  migration  to town,  capital  to establish  factories);  source  of  sources and
cultural  value,  hedge  purchase  funds:  service/business  income  medium/  large
against  inflation)  (rarely  farm  income  or credit);  farmers)
consolidation  of holding  a major
motivating  factor  for large
farmers
Meerut  survey  of 400  Yes,  very (approx.  51  % sales by marginal  14%  by landless  (mainly  for  Not significant  Progressive
district,  buyers  and 400  5,000  sales  per year)  farmers  non-ag  purposes)  (only slight  bimodal  agricultural  area,
western  Uttar  sellers  25% by small  farmers  30%  by marginal  farmers  shift  from marginal  92% sown  area  is
Pradesh  (Mani  and Gandhi  22% by medium  farmers  21%  by small  farmers  and medium  farmers  irrigated
1994)  3% by large farmers  30%  by medium  farmers  towards  small  and
(proportions  correspond  6% by large  farmers  large farmers)
closely  to frequency
distribution  of holdings)  _
10  villages  in  panel  data  (1950-  Yes, fairly  (particularly  Less than a third were  Tend  to be richer farmers;  land  No, and declining  Level  of
semi-arid  82) from  where  land/population  distress  sales (no clustering  consolidation  was a salient  landlessness;  fragmentation  did
areas  in  ICRISAT  village  ratio was  lowest)  of sales  in 'bad' years);  motivating  factor  in about half  mean  farm  size  not change
Andhra  study  program  many sellers  migrated  away  of all cases  declined  sharply.  appreciably,  and
Pradesh,  plus  survey  (NB.  Contradicts  from village;  for  those who  Farm size inversely  was  not observed  to
Madhya  (Walker  and Ryan  Jodha's (1984)  findings  did not migrate  away,  and significantly  be an economic
Pradesh,  1990,  Ballabh  and  that sales  tend to be  raising  dowry  and purchase  correlated  with  liability  (even
Maharashtra,  Walker 1992)  scarce  and limited  to  of non-land  assets  were  productivity  increased
and Gujarat  distress  sales)  most reasons  for  sale  productivity  in
some  cases)
Village  in  Analysis  of village  n/a  44% of households  owning  25% of households  (or  their  n/a  Both upward  and
Maharashtra  records  and  oral  land in 1920  had become  heirs)  that were  landless  in 1920  downward  mobility
history  over  landless  by 1970;  repeated  had acquired  land  by 1970  observed
period  1920-70  partitioning  a major  cause of
(Attwood  1979)  downward  mobility
48Annex 3  Studies of land-lease  markets  in rural  India
Study area  Data,  source  Active  land  lease  Characteristics  of  Characteristics  of lessees!  Increase  in  Comments




Meerut district,  survey of 240  Yes, very (typically  All size groups lease out land,  62% are marginal farmers, 17% are  No: considerable  Findings suggest new
westem Uttar  lessors and 240  converting owned  but especially small and  landless; few small/medium and very  improvement in  technology and markets
Pradesh  lessees  holdings to operational  marginal land holders (47% of  few large farmers lease in land  equity of land  favor small farmers and
(Mani and Gandhi  holdings)  small & 87% marginal farmers  Net impact: sharp reduction  in marginal  distribution  enable marginal farmers to
1994)  lease out all their land)  holdings and large increase in small  improve their position
holdings
Balasore district  75 hh sampled in  Not clear  Larger operators lease out to  Relatively higher proportion of  No  Very little (and
(progressive) and  each of 2 villages in  landless/ marginal farmers as  marginal/small operators lease in, often  diminishing) land-credit
Kalahandi district  each district  tenants to obtain their family  interlinked with labor contracts,  market interlocking, in
(backward),  (Mohapatra 1994)  labor, especially in irrigated  particularly in more progressive areas  contrast with prevalence of
Orissa  villages (greater inequality in  (these arrangements do not  land-labor market
lessor-lessee relations in more  significantly seem to affect  interlocking
progressive areas)  productivity, but much higher poverty
among interlocked tenants)  _
Punjab  216 holdings  Yes, and increased over  Small land holders leaving  Larger operators with sufficient family  Yes (presumably,  Less lease-market activity
(3 regions  sampled in 1971-72;  time: 26% holdings  farming and leasing-out land to  labor and capital, and who have made  though not  in drier, canal-irrigated
distinguished by  226 holdings in  leased-in land in  1971-  larger operators (in all 3  investments in machinery and irrigation  analysed)  areas; productivity grew
irrigation/  1987-88  72, 34% leased-in  regions), also widows and  structures. Over 92% leases on cash  Total operated  fivefold over 1971-72 to
cropping  (Singh et al. 1991)  1987-88. Leased-in area  those working in non-  terms  area fell  1987-88, while land prices
patterns)  as share of total operated  agricultural activities  substantially, as  grew fourfold: land rents
area increased from 9%  farming intensity  grew only threefold,
to  13%  rose  making it rational to lease-
in rather than buy land
Midnapore  survey of all lessees  Yes (sharecropping  Lessors tend to be involved in  All size groups lease in land, to  No  No evidence of
district, West  in 12 villages (3  remains dominant but is  non-agricultural activities (but  predominantly mixed holdings (tenants  interlocking of land and
Bengal  from each of 2  declining, while fixed  a relatively higher share of  also owners): smaller unrecorded  credit markets, but some
blocks in West and  rent tenancies increasing  those leasing to recorded  lessees lease from smaller lessors,  linking of land-lease and
East Midnapore,  in importance, especially  tenants)  larger lessees preferred by large lessors;  labor contracts
ref. period 1986-87)  in more progressive areas  recorded tenants tend to be traditional
(Bhaumik  1993)  during Boro season on  sharecroppers/ laborers of lower caste/
fixed-rent terms)  tribal backgrounds, unrecorded tenants
higher social status, often new entrants
to land-lease market
496 villages in  ICRISAT panel data  Yes: 83%-99% area  Households with lower  Households with higher endowments of  No  Almost all households
semi-arid Andhra  for 1975-1984  sharecropped (often for  endowments of family labor  family labor and bullocks;  were either pure lessors or
Pradesh and  (Skoufias 1995)  less than a year); 76%  and bullocks  NB. higher transaction costs associated  lessees (only 15 of 1,611
Maharashtra  leased area in Aurepalle  with leasing-in cf  leasing-out land;  observations leased-out
(AP) on fixed-rent terms  around 73% of demand for leased-in  and leased-in
owing to high landlord  land was met (cf  Bliss and Stem 1982)  simultaneously)
absenteeism  Jodha (1981): in 4 of the 6 villages,
large farmers had largest share of total
land leased in (34%/6-69%)
Uttar Pradesh  survey of 2,400 hh  Most active in most  Not analysed  Predominantly small farmers (account  Slight shift in  Some evidence, though
throughout state  progressive areas  for 78% of hhs leasing-in, but only 58%  land distribution  weak/ statistically
(Kochar 1992)  (Westem UP) and least  share of sample); but a significant  toward larger  insignificant, that those
progressive  number of large farmers also  farmers in more  with access to formal
(Bundelkhand) -27% of  (especially in more progressive areas of  progressive areas  credit are more likely to
all hhs lease-in land in  Westem/ Central UP, where they  lease-in land
each region - which  account for a disproportionate share of
mirrors all-India pattem  total area leased-in)
Bihar and Punjab  NSS data, 1982  n/a  n/a  Bihar:  Yes in Punjab,  Incidence of 'reverse'
(comparison)  (Parthasarthy 1991)  marginal/landless  19%  no in Bihar  tenancy (large land holders
semi-medium  7%  leasing from small land
medium  4%  holders) suggested to be
large  3%  more common in regions
Punjab:  of high agricultural
marginalAandless  17%  productivity  owing to
semi-medium  41%  better access to formal
medium  26%  credit
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __  _  large  18%
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